Due Process in Bankruptcy: Are the New Automatic Dismissal Rules Constitutional? by Germain, Gregory




DUE PROCESS IN BANKRUPTCY: 




Since its inception, the Bankruptcy Code
1
 has required debtors to 
promptly file comprehensive schedules detailing their income, expenses, 
assets, and liabilities, along with heaps of personal and historical 
information.  The bankruptcy courts were always allowed to dismiss a 
bankruptcy case when a debtor failed or refused to comply with the filing 
requirements.
2
  Before 2005, however, bankruptcy judges had the 
discretion to relieve innocent and harmless mistakes and could never 
dismiss a case without first giving the debtor notice of and an opportunity 
to argue the matter at a hearing. 
In 2005, Congress made substantial changes to the requirements for 
filing and maintaining a bankruptcy case.  According to these changes, 
 
 *  Associate Professor, Syracuse University College of Law. 
 1. 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. [hereinafter, the Bankruptcy Code]. 
 2. See 11 U.S.C. § 707 (1978) (“The court may dismiss a case under this chapter only 
after notice and a hearing and only for cause, including (1) unreasonable delay by the debtor 
that is prejudicial to creditors; and (2) nonpayment of any fees and charges required under 
chapter 123 of title 28.”).  In 1984, Congress changed the “and” connecting subparagraphs 
(1) and (2) to an “or,” and added the provisions allowing the court to dismiss a case for 
“substantial abuse” under Section 707(b).  Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship 
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, §§ 312, 475 (1984).  In 1986, Congress listed as an 
additional defined “cause” for dismissal “(3) failure of the debtor in a voluntary case to file, 
within fifteen days or such additional time as the court may allow after the filing of the 
petition commencing such case, the information required by paragraph 1 of section 521, but 
only on a motion by the United States Trustee.”  Bankruptcy Judges, U.S. Trustees, & 
Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 219 (1986).  At all times, 
dismissal under Section 707 has been discretionary (“may dismiss”), and the court was 
required to give advance notice and an opportunity for a hearing. 
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debtors must file:  (1) copies of their pay stubs (called “payment advices”), 
in addition to their schedules, for all income they received from employers 
during the sixty-day period before bankruptcy,
3
 (2) a statement disclosing 
any anticipated increases in income or expenses after bankruptcy,
4
 and (3) 
(almost all debtors) must complete before filing and file with the court a 
certificate from an approved debtor education course.
5
  The new 
requirements affect cases filed after October 17, 2005. 
In addition to requiring further disclosure, Congress enacted harsh 
measures to assure compliance with the Bankruptcy Code‟s filing 
requirements.  In terms of due process, the most draconian provision is 
Bankruptcy Code § 521(i)(1), which states in relevant part: 
[I]f an individual debtor in a voluntary case under chapter 7 or 13 
fails to file all of the information required by subsection (a)(1) 
within 45 days after the filing of the petition, the case shall be 
automatically dismissed effective on the 46
th
 day after the date of 
the filing of the petition.
6
 
In addition, the bankruptcy court must enter an order of dismissal not later 
than seven days after being requested to do so by any party in interest.
7
 
Congress gave the bankruptcy courts almost no authority to avoid 
automatic dismissal, even for entirely innocent and harmless filing errors.  
There are only two very narrow statutory exceptions to the automatic 
dismissal rule.  First, if a debtor is lucky enough to be aware of the filing 
deficiency, the debtor may file a motion requesting up to an additional 
forty-five days to comply with the filing requirement.
8
  Second, the court 
may deny dismissal if the trustee is aware of the deficiency and files a 
motion within the forty-five day period to relieve the debtor of the filing 
obligation for cause.
9
  Although some courts have attempted to interpret the 
exceptions otherwise, the statutory exceptions by their terms allow no relief 
for debtors/trustees who are not aware of the filing deficiency within the 
forty-five day period, no matter how innocent the debtor‟s mistake or 
harmless the debtor‟s error.
10
 
Furthermore, there are no procedural protections in the statute to 
 
 3. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv) (2010). 
 4. Id. at § 521(a)(1)(B)(v)-(vi). 
 5. Id. at § 521(b)(1). 
 6. Id. at § 521(i)(1) (emphasis added). 
 7. Id. at § 521(i)(2).  Effective December 1, 2009, the Bankruptcy Code was amended 
to change most time periods less than thirty days to multiples of seven.  The method for 
computing time periods was also amended.  See Statutory Time-Periods Technical 
Amendments Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-16 (2009). 
 8. 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(3) (2010). 
 9. Id. at § 521(i)(4). 
 10. See infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text concerning the “orders otherwise” 
language in 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B). 
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assure that a court‟s dismissal is proper.  Gone is the requirement for notice 
and a hearing before dismissal—the dismissal is to be “automatic” upon the 
mere lapse of time, and an order reflecting the dismissal must be entered 
within seven days after a creditor or other party in interest requests one.
11
 
The harshness of the new rule was brought home to me when a 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy case that I was handling pro bono for a very 
sympathetic family was dismissed sua sponte by the bankruptcy court, 
without my advance knowledge or an opportunity for a hearing, due to my 
alleged failure to file the husband‟s pay stubs.
12
  In fact, the husband had no 
pay stubs to file—he had been unemployed during the sixty-day period 
preceding bankruptcy.  The case was wrongly dismissed based on a clerk‟s 
ex parte declaration to the court stating that no pay stubs had been filed.  
Before dismissing the case, the court made no attempt to determine 
whether the client had worked during the sixty-day period and thus had any 
pay stubs to file.
13
  No one contacted me in advance of dismissal to 
determine whether the pay stubs existed or to inquire why they were not 
filed.  The court provided no opportunity for a hearing before dismissal.  
My client‟s bankruptcy case was simply dismissed by the court‟s 
machinery without any care for the debtor‟s rights.  It took a great deal of 
work to have the dismissal set aside, and during the hiatus, the debtor could 
have suffered irreparable damage through the loss of his home to 
foreclosure.
14
  This article is an investigation into the constitutionality of 
the automatic dismissal rules. 
 
 11. 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(2). 
 12. In re Thek, No. 10-60377-6-dd (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2010) (unpublished). 
 13. I do not mean to suggest that the problem was entirely the fault of the bankruptcy 
court in my case.  The court in my district created a local form that is to be filed with the 
petition indicating whether the payment advice statements were being attached, or that there 
were no payment advice statements because the debtor did not work during the applicable 
time period.  This local form was not required by any court rule—it was simply the court‟s 
unwritten custom to have the form filed with the petition.  I had filed the form, indicating 
that the wife‟s payment advice statements were attached.  I did not check a separate box 
further down on the form indicating that the husband did not work during the applicable 
sixty-day time period.  My failure to check this box set in motion the court‟s mechanical 
procedure leading to the improper dismissal of my client‟s case, without notice or an 
opportunity for a hearing.  The mistake could have been easily fixed, and the wrongful 
dismissal prevented, if the court had been required to give me notice and an opportunity for 
a hearing before the dismissal occurred. 
 14. My clients‟ Chapter 13 case was filed to prevent the loss of their home to a property 
tax foreclosure.  Had the county reset the foreclosure sale during the time between the 
dismissal and reinstatement of my client‟s bankruptcy case, my clients very well could have 
lost their home over a very minor clerical mistake.  As discussed below, the dismissal of a 
case is a very serious matter.  While it is difficult to understand why Congress would want 
to require automatic dismissal, even in cases of excusable neglect and harmless error, that is 
clearly what Congress intended.  The question addressed in this article is whether that 
decision by Congress is consistent with the United States Constitution. 
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Part II of this article reviews the operation of the new rules and some 
of the inconsistencies in the language. 
Part III of this article reviews the courts‟ attempts over the past five 
years to make sense of and apply the automatic dismissal rules to real 
world cases.  After more than 100 written decisions, the courts have 
brought little clarity to the confusing statute.  Most courts have strictly 
enforced the statutory terms even when the result is fundamentally unfair.
15
  
Other courts have attempted to find loopholes and inconsistencies in the 
statutory language, of which there are many, to attempt to achieve a fair 
result for the parties, even when the fair result cannot be squared with the 
statutory language and its manifest purpose.  In addition, because the 
automatic dismissal language, if taken literally, would expose almost all 
consumer bankruptcy court orders to uncertainty, the courts have relied on 
principles of res judicata to avoid untimely automatic dismissal requests.
16
  
The end result of the judiciary‟s efforts to interpret the language is greater 
confusion and inconsistency. 
Part IV of this article challenges the automatic dismissal rules for the 
failure to provide debtors with procedural due process.  Despite the courts‟ 
 
 15. See infra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 16. In re Lopez, No. 09-31511-C, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3029, at *9 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 
Sept. 17, 2009) (recognizing that although a case may be automatically dismissed, until an 
order is entered, it continues, and the court‟s rulings will be binding under principles of res 
judicata); In re Ober, 390 B.R. 60, 64 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2008) (preventing creditors, by res 
judicata, from arguing that the case was automatically dismissed after the plan confirmation 
order was entered); In re Gough, No. 07-00554, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 47, at *3-4 (Bankr. 
D.D.C. Jan. 3, 2008) (“Section 521(i)(1) is not jurisdictional:  if a plan is confirmed, that 
will be binding on all creditors and will be res judicata with respect to the issue of whether 
the case was required to be automatically dismissed.”); Jean Braucher, A Guide to 
Interpretation of the 2005 Bankruptcy Law, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 349, 377 (2008) 
(“The better view is to require an order of dismissal for automatic dismissal to occur and to 
treat non-dismissal for failure to file required paperwork as res judicata after entry of a final 
order in the case.”). 
The Supreme Court‟s recent decision in United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa 
strengthens the res judicata argument.  130 S. Ct. 1367 (2010).  The Court in Espinosa ruled 
that a court order confirming a Chapter 13 plan discharging student loans was valid and 
binding, even though the student loans were statutorily non-dischargeable.  Id. at 1378-80.  
A bankruptcy court order is binding, even if wrong, if the court has an “arguable basis” for 
jurisdiction and did not violate the challenger‟s constitutional due process rights (such as by 
not giving the challenger required notice of the proceeding).  Id. at 1377-78, 1380.  The 
Court stated that “[g]iven the Code‟s clear and self-executing requirement for an undue 
hardship determination, the Bankruptcy Court‟s failure to find undue hardship before 
confirming Espinosa‟s plan was a legal error . . . .  But the order remains enforceable and 
binding on United because United had notice of the error and failed to object or timely 
appeal.”  Id. at 1380.  Similarly, an “automatic dismissal” of the case would not change the 
fact that the court had original jurisdiction over the case.  Therefore, absent a failure to 
provide due process by giving required notice of the proceedings to all parties, the 
judgments of the court issued after “automatic dismissal” would be binding unless timely 
challenged through direct appeal. 
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struggles with and obvious distaste for the statutory language, only two 
courts have considered whether the automatic dismissal rules enacted by 
Congress meet constitutional muster.  I conclude that automatic dismissals 
without notice and an opportunity for a hearing are unconstitutional. 
Part V of this article considers whether the Constitution provides 
debtors with substantive protection from automatic dismissals for innocent 
and harmless errors.  Procedural due process only assures the debtor of a 
hearing before dismissal.  While procedural due process would prevent 
judicial errors in cases like mine—where the debtor was in fact in 
compliance with the statutory requirements—a hearing would not provide a 
mechanism for avoiding the unfairness of mandatory dismissal for minor, 
innocent, and harmless clerical mistakes.  Part IV of this article considers 
whether separation of powers or substantive due process principles could 
give the courts the power to relieve these innocent, harmless, and easily 
cured filing errors. 
II. THE NEW AUTOMATIC DISMISSAL RULES 
When the Bankruptcy Code was first enacted in 1978, a bankruptcy 
debtor‟s primary obligations were to:  (1) file lists of creditors and 
schedules of assets, liabilities, and current income and expenses; (2) 
cooperate with the trustee; and (3) turn over property of the bankruptcy 
estate to the trustee.
17
  In 1984, Congress made minor changes to the 
statute, most significantly to require debtors to file (and perform) a 
statement of intention with respect to secured consumer debts.
18
  These 
simple rules remained in effect until 2005. 
The 1978 Bankruptcy Code contained no explicit rules for addressing 
a debtor‟s failure to comply with the filing requirements.  Instead, filing 
deficiencies were handled under the bankruptcy court‟s broad power to 
dismiss cases (or under Chapter 13 to convert or dismiss cases) for “cause 
including [] unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to 
creditors,” but “only after notice and a hearing.”
19
  The courts had no power 
to dismiss bankruptcy cases ex parte—without notice and an opportunity 
for a hearing.  In 1986, Congress specified that failure to file the required 
schedules within “fifteen days or such additional time as the court may 
allow after the filing of the petition” would constitute grounds for dismissal 
 
 17. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub L. No. 95-598 (1978) [hereinafter “Reform 
Act”], 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)-(3) (1978), reprinted in COLLIER ON BANKR., App. Pt. 4 (MB 
2010). 
 18. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353 
(1984) [hereinafter “BAFJA”], § 305, reprinted in COLLIER ON BANKR., App. Pt. 6 (MB 
2010). 
 19. Reform Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 707(a), 1307(c) (1978). 
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“but only on a motion by the United States trustee.”
20
  This confirmed the 
role of the new United States Trustees to police the bankruptcy filing 
requirements.  The 1984 Amendments added an additional itemized ground 
for dismissal, “substantial abuse,”
21
 but retained both broad judicial 
discretion in deciding whether to dismiss cases for substantial abuse, and 
the requirement that the debtor be given notice of and an opportunity for a 
hearing before dismissal could occur. 
In 2005, Congress made substantial changes to the liberal bankruptcy 
filing procedures that had been in effect since the enactment of the 
Bankruptcy Code.  Initially, Congress replaced the old “substantial abuse” 
standard with a general “abuse” standard for dismissal, which would surely 
have been a change of little moment as long as the test was subject to the 
bankruptcy judge‟s discretion.
22
  Congress also expanded the list of parties 
who could bring a motion for dismissal for abuse from only the court or the 
United States Trustee to any “party in interest,”
23
 which would include 
creditors. 
The most important substantive change was buried in pages of new 
rules added to the previously short and simple dismissal provision.  
Congress felt that bankruptcy was becoming the first rather than last resort 
of people who had financial problems.
24
  Congress sought to remedy the 
problem by adding a complex, formula-based “means test” to qualify for 
Chapter 7 relief.  The means test has two parts.  Consumer debtors 
automatically qualify for Chapter 7 relief if they had less than the median 
gross income in the state for their family size during the six months 
preceding bankruptcy.  Those who had above-median income during the 
six months before bankruptcy have to satisfy a very complicated formula-
based test to qualify for Chapter 7 relief.
25
  The new rules require the 
 
 20. Bankruptcy Judges, U.S. Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, 
Pub. L. No. 99-554 (1986) § 219, reprinted in COLLIER ON BANKR., App. Pt. 7 (MB 2010). 
 21. BAFJA § 312 (adding 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)), § 229 (adding a similar provision in 
Chapter 13, 11 U.S.C. § 1307(d)(9)-(10) (1984)). 
 22. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 
[hereinafter “BAPCPA”], § 102(a)(2)(B)(i)(III), reprinted in COLLIER ON BANKR., App. Pt. 
10(a) (MB 2010), codified at 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) (2006). 
 23. BAPCPA § 102(a)(2)(B)(i)(I)-(II). 
 24. See Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485, 488, 495, 565-67 (2005) 
(quoting, among others, Representative George Gekas‟s vocal support at House hearings for 
the view that, although “[h]istorically, bankruptcy was intended as a last resort . . . . 
[u]nfortunately, [it] has become a way for reckless spenders to escape their debts,” and 
President Bush‟s remarks prior to and during the signing into law of the 2005 Amendments, 
indicating his estimation that they would provide a remedy for this problem). 
 25. The actual means test calculation for above-median debtors is relegated to this 
footnote because it is so unnecessarily convoluted.  Above median debtors have to compute 
their pro forma “current monthly income” by taking their average monthly gross income 
during the six months before bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A) (2010), and subtracting the 
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debtor‟s lawyer to police the means test by determining, after a reasonable 
investigation, that the petition is well grounded in fact and warranted.
26
  
The rules also expose the debtor‟s attorney to sanctions and dismissal 
expenses if it is later determined that the means test was not satisfied.
27
  A 
multi-page official form was promptly developed that must be filed in 
every consumer Chapter 7 case to show compliance with the means test.
28
 
The means test was also incorporated into the individual 
reorganization chapters of the Bankruptcy Code through the requirement 
that a debtor must pay all “projected disposable income” to unsecured 
creditors during the three-to-five-year plan period.
29
  “Disposable income” 
means, in essence, means-test income (average gross income for six 
months before bankruptcy, less expenses allowed by the Internal Revenue 
Service for deferring collection and other expenses allowed by statute).
30
  A 
similar means test form was developed, which must be filed in Chapter 11 
and Chapter 13 consumer cases to establish the debtor‟s “disposable 
 
monthly expenses allowed by the Internal Revenue Service for deferring income tax 
collections, 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I).  Additional adjustments are allowed for actual 
expenses to care and support elderly individuals, for expenses to support chronically ill or 
disabled members of the debtor‟s household or immediate family, 11 U.S.C. § 
707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(II), for bankruptcy administrative expenses, 11 U.S.C. § 
707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(III), for dependents‟ school tuition up to $1,775 per child per year, 11 
U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV), for actual higher energy costs, 11 U.S.C. § 
707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(V), for child support or alimony, 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iv), and, most 
importantly, for secured debt payments, 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii), that can be unlimited 
in amount.  Once the debtor‟s average six-month prior income and allowed expenses are 
netted into a net income figure, the means test formula can be applied.  The debtor flunks 
the means test, and the case must generally be dismissed, if the debtor‟s pro forma net 
monthly income for five years (multiplied by sixty) exceeds the lesser of (1) the greater of 
25 percent of the debtor‟s non-priority unsecured debts, or $7,025, or (2) $11,725.  11 
U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (2010).  The means test presumption can be rebutted only by 
making a detailed showing of special circumstances for which there is no reasonable 
alternative justifying additional expenses, such as a serious medical condition or a call to 
service in the armed forces.  11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i).  The bottom line is that the debtor 
cannot have pro forma net income exceeding $182.50 per month, and sometimes less, and 
still qualify for bankruptcy, based on the statutory income and expense components. 
 26. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(4)(C) (2010). 
 27. Id. at § 707(b)(4)(A)-(C). 
 28. The eight-page form for Chapter 7 cases is Official Form B22A (entitled “Chapter 7 
Statement of Current Monthly Income and Means-Test Calculation”). 
 29. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(15)(B) (2010) (providing that a court will confirm an 
individual debtor‟s plan over an unsecured claim holder‟s objection only where “the value 
to be distributed under the plan is not less than the projected disposable income of the 
debtor . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also id. at § 1225(b)(1)(C) (providing that the value of 
property to be distributed over a three-year period is “not less than the debtor‟s projected 
disposable income for [that period].”) (emphasis added); id. at § 1325(b)(1)(B) (providing 
that “the plan provides that all the debtor‟s projected disposable income to be received . . . 
will be applied to make payments . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 30. Id. at § 1325(b)(2). 
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  Adding further complication to an already complex mechanical 
scheme, the Supreme Court recently determined that Congress‟s use of the 
term “projected disposable income” rather than simply “disposable 
income” in the reorganization chapters allows for the adjustment of the 
mechanical, backward-looking means test income in light of materially 
changed circumstances as of the petition date, even though the mechanical 
means test income is to be presumptively projected forward in the absence 
of clear proof of changed circumstances.
32
  This ruling adds judicial 
discretion, and also some uncertainty, to the mechanical test used in 
reorganization cases. 
While Congress‟s new means test contains onerous computation and 
documentation requirements, Congress did not tinker with the original 
procedural rules for dismissing cases when a debtor does not satisfy the 
means test.  The court may dismiss a case under the means test “only after 
notice and a hearing.”
33
  While the means test may require dismissal under 
certain factual circumstances, a debtor‟s procedural rights are protected by 
the “notice and hearing” requirement, and a debtor‟s substantive rights are 
protected by a fact-based determination of the financial standard 
established by Congress.  The means test rules do not require automatic 
dismissal nor do they prevent the courts from allowing the correction of 
calculation or documentation errors.
34
 
Congress also made substantial changes to a formerly sleepy section 
of the Bankruptcy Code labeled “Debtor‟s Duties”—§ 521.  Prior to the 
2005 Amendments, § 521 merely outlined the debtor‟s duty to:  (1) file a 
list of creditors and schedules; cooperate with and turn over property of the 
estate and any books and records to the trustee; and (3) appear at any 
 
 31. The two-page form for Chapter 11 cases is Official Form B22B, and the eight-page 
form for Chapter 13 cases is Official Form B22C. 
 32. Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464 (2010). 
 33. 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) (2010).  See also id. at § 1112(b)(1) ([O]n request of a party in 
interest, and after notice and a hearing, . . . the court shall convert . . . or dismiss  . . . .”) 
(emphasis added); id. at § 1208(c) (“[O]n request of a party in interest, and after notice and 
a hearing, the court may dismiss . . . .”) (emphasis added); id. at § 1307(c) (“[O]n request of 
a party in interest or the United States trustee and after notice and a hearing, the court may 
convert . . . or may dismiss . . . .”) (emphasis added); id. at § 1307(e) (“Upon the failure of 
the debtor to file a tax return . . . on request of a party in interest or the United States trustee 
and after notice and a hearing . . . the court shall dismiss . . . or convert . . . .”) (emphasis 
added). 
 34. The bankruptcy rules liberally allow amendments to petitions, lists, schedules and 
statements at any time before the case is closed.  See FED. R. BANKR. P. 1009(a) (“General 
Right to Amend.  A voluntary petition, list, schedule, or statement may be amended by the 
debtor as a matter of course at any time before the case is closed. . . . [and o]n motion of a 
party in interest . . . the court may order [any amendment] . . . .”).  The bankruptcy rules also 
allow the court to relieve a party from mistakes, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.  
See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9024 (incorporating FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1)). 
GERMAINFINALIZED_ONE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/28/2011  7:33 PM 
2011] DUE PROCESS IN BANKRUPTCY 555 
 
discharge hearing scheduled by the court.
35
  Any penalties for non-
compliance were left to the general dismissal provisions, all of which, as 
previously discussed, protected the debtor‟s substantive and procedural due 
process rights by requiring notice and an opportunity for a hearing before 
dismissal, and by giving the courts discretion to allow harmless errors and 
clerical mistakes to be cured.
36
 
Moreover, the court had the power to relieve the debtor of the 
requirement to file all but the list of creditors.  The prefatory language of § 
521(a)(1)(B) has always required the debtor to file the required documents 
“unless the court orders otherwise.”
37
 
Congress‟s changes to § 521 were substantial.  First, Congress added 
further requirements:  (1) certification that the debtor received notice 
concerning the different chapters of the Bankruptcy Code,
38
 (2) the means 
test statement,
39
 (3) a statement of “reasonably anticipated increase in 
income or expenditures” during the year following bankruptcy,
40
 (4) a 
certificate showing completion of the pre-bankruptcy credit counseling 
requirement,
41
 and, most importantly for this article (5) “copies of all 
payment advices or other evidence of payment received within 60 days 
before the date of the filing of the petition, by the debtor from any 
employer of the debtor.”
42
 
The payment advice requirement raises important issues because 
compliance or non-compliance cannot be determined merely by looking at 
the docket sheet to see what has been filed.  All of the other documents 
must be filed by every consumer debtor.  Payment advice statements, on 
the other hand, must only be filed by debtors who were employed during 
the sixty days preceding bankruptcy, received payments from the employer, 
and received “payment advices or other evidence of payment” from the 
employer.  For example, debtors who were unemployed or on vacation 
during all or part of the sixty-day period would not be required to file 
statements.  In order to determine whether the debtor violated the 
provision, a determination must be made that the debtor received payment 
advices from employers, was obligated to file them, and failed to do so.  
This requires a factual determination that cannot be made from a cold 
review of the docket sheet. 
 
 35. 11 U.S.C. § 521 (1984). 
 36. See supra notes 33-35 (discussing a “[g]eneral [r]ight to [a]mend” any materials 
submitted to the court and referencing 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) indicating that “[t]he court may 
dismiss a case . . . only after notice and a hearing . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 37. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B). 
 38. Id. at § 521(a)(1)(B)(iii) (2010). 
 39. Id. at § 521(a)(1)(B)(v). 
 40. Id. at § 521(a)(1)(B)(vi). 
 41. Id. at § 521(b). 
 42. Id. at § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv). 
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The most troubling aspect of the amendments from a due process 
point of view is buried in subsection (i) of the statute: 
Subject to paragraphs (2) and (4) and notwithstanding section 
707(a), if an individual debtor in a voluntary case under chapter 7 
or 13 fails to file all of the information required under subsection 
(a)(1) within 45 days after the date of the filing of the petition, 
the case shall be AUTOMATICALLY DISMISSED effective on the 
46th day after the date of the filing of the petition.
43
 
The reference to paragraphs (2) and (4) appears to be in error—
Congress almost certainly meant to reference paragraphs (3) and (4), which 
contain limited exceptions to the forty-five day rule.  Paragraph (2) does 
not contain an exception to the rule.  Rather, if the debtor has not complied 
with the filing duties under paragraph (1), paragraph (2) requires the court 
to enter an order of dismissal within five days after a party in interest 
requests one: 
(2) Subject to paragraph (4) and with respect to a case described 
in paragraph (1), any party in interest may request the court to 
enter an order dismissing the case.  If requested, the court shall 




Paragraphs (3) and (4), on the other hand, contain exceptions to the 
general rule in paragraph (1).  Paragraph (3) allows the court to grant up to 
an additional forty-five days for compliance if the debtor makes a request 
for an extension within the original forty-five day period: 
(3) Subject to paragraph (4) and upon request of the debtor made 
within 45 days after the date of the filing of the petition described 
in paragraph (1), the court may allow the debtor an additional 
period of not to exceed 45 days to file the information required 
under subsection (a)(1) if the court finds justification for 
extending the period for the filing.
45
 
Paragraph (4) allows the court to refuse dismissal on the request of the 
trustee if the court determines that the debtor attempted in good faith to 
comply with the statute, and the best interests of creditors would be served 
by refusing dismissal.  The statute creates great confusion concerning when 
the trustee‟s motion must be filed to be effective: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subsection, on the 
motion of the trustee filed before the expiration of the applicable 
period of time specified in paragraph (1), (2), or (3), and after 
notice and a hearing, the court may decline to dismiss the case if 
 
 43. Id. at § 521(i)(1) (2010) (emphasis added). 
 44. Id. at § 521(i)(2). 
 45. Id. at § 521(i)(3). 
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the court finds that the debtor attempted in good faith to file all 
the information required by subsection (a)(1)(B)(iv) and that the 




It is the cross reference to paragraph (2) in the quoted provision that 
creates the most confusion.  Paragraph (2) by its terms only applies to a 
request for an order of dismissal after the forty-five day period has expired 
and the case has been automatically dismissed.  If the trustee opposes a 
request for dismissal made under paragraph (2) and the court refuses 
dismissal, is the case reinstated by the court‟s denial?  Is the automatic 
dismissal annulled?  Does the case remain automatically dismissed sans 
court order?  Sloppy drafting leaves these questions unresolved and subject 
to judicial interpretation.  But this very limited exception, utilized in 
accordance with its terms only in one written opinion in the five years since 
enactment, has been used by some courts to undermine the clear language 
of the main rule requiring cases to be “automatically dismissed.”
47
 
The operative provision in the statute, subsection (1), gives the court 
no discretion but to dismiss when neither of the limited exceptions (debtor 
motion for extension of time up to forty-five days or trustee motion to 
excuse dismissal) applies.  Nevertheless, as is discussed in the next section, 
some courts have found an additional exception in § 521(a)(1)(B), which 
requires the documents to be filed “unless the court orders otherwise.”  
Some courts have retroactively forgiven the filing requirements after the 
case has been “automatically dismissed.”
48
  However, retroactively 
forgiving the filing requirements after the case has already been 
“automatically dismissed” is inconsistent with the purpose and intent of the 
statute, as the Supreme Court recently noted in dicta.
49
  If the debtor does 
not know about a filing error during the forty-five day period, the case is 
“automatically dismissed,” and an order must be entered to that effect 
within seven days after any party in interest requests it, subject only to the 
possibility of a trustee motion within the forty-five or seven-day period 
requesting that the case not be dismissed due to excusable neglect and in 
the best interests of creditors.
50
 
Congress added many other provisions to § 521.  There are provisions 
requiring the debtor to file proof that the debtor completed a pre-petition 
 
 46. Id. at § 521(i)(4). 
 47. See infra note 147 and accompanying text. 
 48. See infra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 49. See infra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 50. The statute fails to explain what happens to a case that has been “automatically 
dismissed” but for which the court may refuse to enter a dismissal order.  Presumably, the 
case would continue and the dismissal would become moot by the court‟s later action under 
principles of res judicata.  The statute is simply logically inconsistent under these 
circumstances. 
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 to provide to the trustee (and upon request to a 
creditor) certain tax returns,
52
 to provide identifying information to the 
trustee,
53
 to file documents showing any interest in an Individual 
Retirement Account or State tuition program,
54
 and to perform 
administrative obligations under any qualified ERISA plans in which the 
debtor is an administrator.
55
  These rules do not mandate a specific remedy 
for violations and therefore do not raise the same due process concerns as 
the automatic dismissal rules. 
However, another new provision raises similar due process concerns.  
The statute also requires the debtor to take prompt action with respect to 
personal property subject to a security interest, lease or bailment.  The 
language is very poorly drafted and confusing, but it generally requires the 
debtor to promptly elect between surrendering the collateral and redeeming 
or reaffirming the debts, and provides for the automatic termination of the 
 
 51. 11 U.S.C. § 521(b) (2010).  The debtor must file a certificate from an approved 
nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency showing that the debtor completed the new 
prepetition debtor education requirement contained in Section 109(h).  Id.  The statute also 
requires filing any debt repayment plan developed in the course.  Id. 
 52. At least seven days before the first date set for the meeting of creditors, the debtor 
must provide the trustee with a copy of the debtor‟s federal income tax return for the most 
recent tax year, and upon request must provide a copy to any creditors who request it.  11 
U.S.C. § 521(e)(2)(A)(i)-(ii).  The statute provides for dismissal of the case if the debtor 
fails to provide the tax return unless “the debtor demonstrates that the failure to so comply is 
due to circumstances beyond the control of the debtor.”  Id. at § 521(e)(2)(B).  Although the 
statute does not specify that notice and an opportunity for a hearing would be required 
before dismissal, the statute also does not provide for automatic dismissal.  Because the 
debtor may avoid dismissal by showing justification, and because the statute requires the 
court to dismiss the case, I believe the statute implicitly requires notice and an opportunity 
for a hearing before dismissal. 
Section 521(f) requires the debtor to file with the court any post-petition federal tax 
returns filed while the case is pending, any pre-petition federal tax returns that are filed late 
during the bankruptcy case covering the three tax years before the petition date, and any 
federal tax return amendments to these returns.  Id. at § 521(f)(1)-(3).  In addition, in 
Chapter 13 cases, the debtor must file an annual statement under penalty of perjury of 
income and expenses, by month.  Id. at § 521(f)(4), (g)(1).  The returns and Chapter 13 
income and expense statements must be made available to all parties in interest, subject to 
certain privacy restrictions.  Id. at § 521(g)(2). 
Section 521(j) allows a taxing authority to request dismissal of the debtor‟s case if the 
debtor fails to timely file any tax returns that are due during the pendency of the case, but 
allows the debtor to avoid dismissal by filing the return within ninety days after the taxing 
authority‟s request.  Id. at § 521(j). 
 53. The debtor must provide on request of the trustee or the United States Trustee a 
driver‟s license or other identifying information.  Id. at § 521(h). 
 54. The debtor must file a record showing any interest in an Individual Retirement 
Account or state tuition program.  Id. at § 521(c). 
 55. Id. at § 521(a)(7) (a debtor who is acting as an administrator under an ERISA 
retirement plan must continue to perform the plan administration functions). 
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automatic stay if the debtor fails to comply with the requirements.
56
  The 
automatic termination of the automatic stay raises the same kinds of 
procedural due process problems discussed in Part III below because the 
statute withdraws a benefit without providing advance notice or an 




 56. Section 521(a)(2) requires the debtor to file a statement of intention regarding the 
collateral within thirty days (or such additional time as the court may fix), and to actually 
surrender the collateral, or redeem or reaffirm the secured debts, within thirty days after the 
first date set for the meeting of creditors (or such additional time as is allowed by the court 
during that thirty day period).  Id. at § 521(a)(2) (2010).  Section 362(h)(1) provides for the 
automatic termination of the automatic stay if the debtor fails to file the statement or 
perform the act timely.  Id. at § 362(h)(1).  However, the trustee can request before the 
period expires that the stay not be terminated if the property would be of value to the estate.  
Id. at 362(h)(2).  The automatic termination of the automatic stay is very harsh, and can 
result in a debtor losing valuable property because the debtor is not aware of these new 
technical requirements.  See, e.g., In re Carrillo, No. 6:09-bk-09152-ABB, 2010 Bankr. 
LEXIS 61 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Jan. 8, 2010) (pro se debtor lost car in repossession due to 
failure to file statement of intention). 
Section 521(a)(6) requires an individual debtor holding personal property secured by a 
purchase money security interest to “not retain possession of personal property” unless 
within forty-five days after the first meeting of creditors the debtor either enters into an 
agreement with the creditor or redeems the property.  Id. at § 521(a)(6) (2010).  If the debtor 
does not surrender, redeem, or enter into an agreement with the creditor within the forty-five 
day period, the automatic stay automatically terminates and the property is no longer 
property of the estate, unless the trustee moves within the forty-five day period to maintain 
the stay and the property of the estate, and the court determines that the property is of 
“consequential value or benefit to the estate.”  Id. at § 521(a) (flush language).  If the trustee 
timely files a motion, the court may maintain the automatic stay but must order the debtor to 
turn over the property to the trustee, and must order the trustee to make adequate protection 
payments.  Id. 
Subsection 521(d) provides that a lessor or bailor can enforce a so-called “ipso-facto” 
clause in the contract or lease (under which the debtor is automatically in default as a result 
of the bankruptcy filing) if the lessor or bailor “holds a security interest” in the property, and 
the debtor has not complied with either § 521(a)(6) or § 362(h)(1) (or (2)).  Id. at § 521(d).  
The reference to § 521(a)(6) is confusing because that section specifically refers to purchase 
money security interests, not leases or bailments.  Section 362(h) contains similar rules to 
521(a)(6) for leased property, providing for the automatic termination of the automatic stay 
if the debtor does not file a statement of intent to either surrender, redeem or reaffirm within 
thirty days, and then perform the stated intention within the next thirty days (although 
redemption should be inapplicable to leased property).  Id. at § 362(h).  However, the 
provision does not apply if the debtor offers to reaffirm, and the lessor refuses.  Id. at § 
362(h)(1)(B).  There is also a provision similar to § 521(a)(6), under which the trustee can 
file a motion within the initial thirty day period to maintain the automatic stay.  Id. at § 
362(h)(2). 
 57. As is explained infra in Part III, by providing debtors with an automatic stay, 
Congress has created an entitlement.  It cannot then automatically terminate the entitlement 
without giving advance notice and providing an opportunity for a hearing before 
termination, or under some circumstances at least an opportunity for a prompt post-
deprivation hearing. 
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III.   THE CONFLICTING JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO THE AUTOMATIC 
DISMISSAL RULES 
One bankruptcy judge summed up his views about automatic 
dismissal in a poem:  
I do not like dismissal automatic, 
It seems to me to be traumatic. 
*** 
How can any person know 
what the docket does not show? 
What is the clue on the 46th day? 
Is the case still here, or gone away? 
*** 
And if the case goes on as normal 
and debtor gets a discharge formal, 
what if a year later some fanatic 
claims the case was dismissed automatic? 
Was there a case, or wasn‟t there one? 
How do you undo what‟s been done? 
*** 
Before this problem gets too old 
it would be good if we were told: 
What does automatic dismissal mean? 
And by what means can it been seen? 
Are we only left to guess? 
Oh please Congress, fix this mess!
58
 
Federal courts are loath to dismiss cases as a sanction for even fairly 
serious transgressions.  For example, the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit recently overturned as an abuse of discretion a district court‟s 
decision to dismiss a case where the plaintiff destroyed key evidence in the 
case after being served with discovery requests, saying “dismissal is a 
drastic remedy . . . [that] should be imposed only in extreme circumstances, 
usually after consideration of alternative, less drastic sanctions.”
59
 
Dismissal of a bankruptcy case (especially without advance notice) 
carries special risks.  Upon dismissal, the automatic stay is terminated, 
allowing creditors to proceed to enforce their rights against the debtor‟s 
 
 58. In re Riddle, 344 B.R. 702, 703 (Bankr. S.D.Fla. 2006) (emphasis omitted). 
 59. West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999) (citations 
and internal quotations omitted); accord Dahoda v. John Deere Co., 216 F. App‟x 124 (2d 
Cir. 2007).  See also e.g., Flury v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 427 F.3d 939, 944 (11th Cir. 
2005) (holding that the dismissal of an action is a severe remedy befitting only extreme 
misconduct because it runs counter to the strong policy favoring the disposition of cases on 
the merits); Silvestri v. GMC, 271 F.3d 583, 593 (4th Cir. 2001) (“We agree . . . that 
dismissal is severe and constitutes the ultimate sanction for spoliation.  It is usually justified 
only in circumstances of bad faith or other „like action.‟”) (citations omitted). 
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  Moreover, if the debtor promptly files a new bankruptcy case, 
the automatic stay will only be in effect for thirty days.
61
  To extend the 
automatic stay after the initial thirty-day period, the debtor must promptly 
file a motion to maintain the automatic stay, and establish to the court‟s 
satisfaction, after notice and a hearing, the good faith of the second case.
62
  
The debtor also must pay an additional filing fee, update and re-file all of 
the papers that previously were filed, and wait a new period before 
receiving a discharge.  At best, re-filing the case is a waste of time, money, 
and judicial and party resources. 
The idea of automatic dismissal is especially foreign to the practice of 
bankruptcy.  It often has been said that bankruptcy courts are courts of 
equity, and they often have interpreted broadly their powers to do what is 
right and equitable.
63
  The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure reflect 
that less formal and more practical ethos.  For example, Rule 9005 
incorporates the “harmless error” Rule 61 from the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which mandates the court “at every stage of the proceeding . . . 
[to] disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party‟s 
substantive rights.”
64
  The Bankruptcy Rules also liberally allow 
amendments to pleadings and other filed documents
65
 and even provide for 
relief from final judgments or orders as a result of “mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise or excusable neglect” on such terms as the court finds just.
66
 
Because the concept of automatic dismissal for trivial filing errors is 
so antithetical to the bankruptcy courts‟ ethos, it is somewhat surprising 
that the courts‟ initial reaction to the automatic dismissal rules was 
acceptance.  It did not matter that the debtors were honest and acting in 
good faith,
67




 60. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(B) (2010). 
 61. Id. at § 362(c)(3)(A). 
 62. Id. at § 362(c)(3)(B). 
 63. See, e.g., Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 81 (1989) (“Indeed, we have 
stated that „bankruptcy courts are inherently proceedings in equity.‟”); SEC v. U.S. Realty 
& Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 455 (1940) (“A bankruptcy court is a court of equity, 
and is guided by equitable doctrines and principles except in so far as they are inconsistent 
with the Act.”); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 (1939) (“[A] bankruptcy court is a court 
of equity at least in the sense that in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by the 
act, it applies the principles and rules of equity jurisprudence.” ); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 
292 U.S. 234, 240 (1934) (“Courts of bankruptcy are essentially courts of equity, and their 
proceedings inherently proceedings in equity.”); In re Beaty, 306 F.3d 914, 922 (9th Cir. 
2002) (“[A] bankruptcy court is a court of equity and should invoke equitable principles and 
doctrines, refusing to do so only where their application would be inconsistent with the 
Bankruptcy Code.”). 
 64. 11 U.S.C. § 9005. 
 65. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 1009(a) (“A voluntary petition, list, schedule, or statement 
may be amended by the debtor as a matter of course at any time before the case is closed.”). 
 66. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9024(b). 
 67. In re Ott, 343 B.R. 264, 268 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2006) (denying motion to reinstate 
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provided the documents to the trustee rather than the court due to a 
misunderstanding of the new rules,
69
 made a simple mistake of filing an 
earlier year‟s payment advice statement for one two-week period,
70
 could 
not timely obtain copies of the payment advices from an employer or find 
the missing statements,
71
 did not realize a pay stub received exactly on the 
sixtieth
 
day before bankruptcy had to be filed,
72
  would face the loss of a 
home due to foreclosure,
73
 or even that the debtor‟s attorney made a 
mistake by re-uploading to the court‟s computer system the file containing 




due to filing errors, stating:  “Here, this Court is presented with impecunious, but seemingly 
honest debtors, guided by responsible counsel, acting in good faith to attain the benefits of a 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy—and receive a fresh financial start.  But, the language and intent of 
Congress is clear in 11 U.S.C. § 521(i):  the Court has no discretion to remedy any mistake 
or error—large or small—by a debtor or debtor‟s counsel.  This case must be dismissed.”).   
See also In re Calhoun, 359 B.R. 738 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2007) (Debtor claims he sent his 
payment advices to the trustee by fax within the forty-five day period, and also delivered 
them to the trustee at the first meeting of creditors.  Nevertheless, case properly dismissed 
because the advices were not timely filed with the court.); In re Bonner, 374 B.R. 62, 64 
(Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 2007) (holding that although five of the six pay stubs were timely filed, 
the court nevertheless has no discretion but to dismiss case:  “His unfortunate mistake does 
not by itself provide sufficient justification to waive the clear Congressional mandate in 
section 521(i)(1).”). 
 68. See, e.g., In re Vass, No. 08-16626-SSM, 2009 WL 909243, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 
Feb. 3, 2009) (dismissing pro se debtor‟s case for failing to file required documents:  
“Accordingly, the court, although sympathetic to the debtor‟s situation, has no discretion to 
allow the case to continue.”); In re Kelly, No. 06-71019-JB, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3570 
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. Nov. 27, 2006) (no discretion even for pro se debtor). 
 69. In re Conner, No. 06-40061-LMK, 2006 WL 1548620, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. May 
16, 2006) (“[D]ue to a misunderstanding regarding the recent changes in the bankruptcy 
law, the income records were provided to the Trustee‟s Office, but were not filed with the 
Clerk‟s Office, and that no party would be prejudiced by the Court‟s granting the Motion. 
However, the Court has no discretion in this matter.”). 
 70. In re Wilkinson, 346 B.R. 539, 545-46 (Bankr. D. Utah 2006) (Debtor thought she 
filed 60 days of pay stubs, but one of the stubs was from a year earlier.  When error was 
discovered after forty-five day period at the time of plan confirmation, the court ordered 
case dismissed, and denied the debtor‟s motion to reinstate, saying:  “The Court simply 
cannot do violence to a specific statutory scheme in the name of equity. . . .  For better or 
worse, a harsh result is not the same as an absurd result, and it is not absurd to think that 
Congress intended harsh results when the dictates of the BAPCPA are not followed.”). 
 71. See In re New, No. 07-75092, 2008 WL 7872884, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Jan. 9, 
2008) (Debtor claims couldn‟t find or obtain missing pay stubs.  “Once such a section 541(i) 
motion is filed and if the facts support the motion, the court has no discretion to order 
otherwise.”); In re Reyes, No. 05-80225, 2006 WL 4847230, at *2 (Bankr. D. Utah Feb. 21, 
2006) (denying request to reinstate case because debtor was unable to obtain copies of 
payment advices from her employer within 45 day period). 
 72. In re Neil, No. 07-21107, 2007 WL 2915851 (Bankr. D. Utah Aug. 9, 2007). 
 73. In re Evans, No. 08-71204-CMS-7, 2009 WL 1651383 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. June 12, 
2009). 
 74. In re Giacoma, No. 06-24662, 2007 WL 2916297 (Bankr. D. Utah Mar. 22, 2007).  
After receiving a deficiency notice from the court regarding some missing pay stubs, debtor 
GERMAINFINALIZED_ONE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/28/2011  7:33 PM 
2011] DUE PROCESS IN BANKRUPTCY 563 
 
The courts consistently held that they had no power to avoid dismissal.
75
  
Then came the bad debtor cases. 
A.   The Bad Debtor Cases 
The courts promptly recognized a judicial exception to the automatic 
dismissal rules for debtors who were attempting to abuse the bankruptcy 
process by seeking the dismissal of their own case.  In In re Parker,
76
 the 
debtor sought to dismiss his own bankruptcy case because he did not 
complete the debtor education requirements before filing and did not file 
payment advice statements.  The bankruptcy court denied dismissal, 
holding that the educational requirements are not listed under the automatic 
dismissal rules of § 521(i), that the debtor was estopped from seeking 
discretionary dismissal, and that it was not clear that the debtor received 
payment advices (he was self employed).
77
  But the court also stated that it 
would “order otherwise” under § 521(a)(1)(B) if the payment advices were 
due: 
Section 521 does not set forth the time period within which the 
Court can “order otherwise,” as BAPCPA does in numerous 
other sections.  The statute would seem to permit the Court to 
excuse the filing requirements in a case at any time, before or 
 
delivered the missing statements to the attorney, and attorney attempted to upload the 
documents to the court.  Id.  Unfortunately, the attorney uploaded the wrong scanned file.  
Court denied motion to reinstatement nunc pro tunc, claiming that the debtor‟s attorney had 
a duty to review the docket to make sure the right files were uploaded.  Id.  This case should 
concern lawyers who have dealt with the court‟s electronic filing system, because the 
court‟s system does not allow a filer to look at the selected file before uploading it. 
 75. In re Bopp, No. 10-00121, 2010 WL 2363626 (Bankr. D.D.C. June 7, 2010) (no 
discretion); In re Leviner, No. A09-87983-PWB, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 457, at * 2 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ga. Jan. 14, 2010) (“Without deciding the issue of whether the Court can even vacate 
an order that is entered under § 521(i), the Court declines to grant the Debtor‟s motion 
because the Debtor has asserted no error of fact or law that warrants reconsideration of the 
order of dismissal.”); In re Nuttall, No. 08-04092-8-JRL, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 2658 (Bankr. 
E.D. N.C. Sept. 22, 2008) (dismissal for failing to file means test form, even though debtor 
not subject to means test); In re Scott, No. 08-21447, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 2085, at *5 
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. July 28, 2008) (“The Bankruptcy Court has no discretion to enlarge the 
time limitations in §521(i)(1), after the time limitations have expired, based on „excusable 
neglect‟ on the part of the debtor or debtor‟s counsel.”); In re Turner, 384 B.R. 852 (Bankr. 
D. Colo. 2008) (dismissal for failing to file means test form, even though debtor not subject 
to means test); In re Marinaccio-Amsden, 373 B.R. 806 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 2007) (no 
discretion); In re Young, No. 06-80397, 2006 WL 3524482 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2006) 
(no discretion); In re Smith, 352 B.R. 729 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 2006) (no discretion); In re 
Williams, 339 B.R. 794 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006) (no discretion); In re Fawson, 338 B.R. 
505, 515 (Bankr. D. Utah 2006) (no discretion); In re Woodard, No. 05-06092-5-ATS, 2006 
Bankr. LEXIS 4586 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. Feb. 9, 2006) (no discretion). 
 76. 351 B.R. 790 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006). 
 77. Id. at 802. 
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after the 45-day period, under appropriate circumstances.
78
 
The court also ruled that “automatic dismissal” should not be self-
executing, essentially that “automatic dismissal” should not be 
“automatic,” and instead should simply permit the court to enter an order of 
dismissal without notice and a hearing. 
What, then, is the meaning of “automatic dismissal?” . . . It seems 
logical, therefore, that “automatic dismissal” would not require 
notice and a hearing.  Rather, it is a determination that the court 




In other words, the statutory requirement that “the case shall be 
automatically dismissed effective on the 46th day”
80
 is neither mandatory, 
automatic, nor effective until the court enters an order.  Most other courts 
readily accepted the Parker court‟s tortured reading of the statute to 
prevent debtors from abusing the bankruptcy process by seeking dismissals 
of their own cases.
81
  While many courts disagreed with the reasoning of 
Parker when applied to third party dismissal requests,
82
 I could find only 
 
 78. Id. at 801 (citations in footnote omitted). 
 79. Id.  Accord In re Gough, No. 07-00554, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 47, at *2-3 (Bankr. 
D.D.C. Jan. 3, 2008). 
 80. 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(1) (2010). 
 81. See, e.g., In re De Armas Cubas, No. 09-01933, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3383 (Bankr. 
P.R. Oct. 14, 2009) (granting motion by trustee to reconsider order refusing to reinstate case 
following mandatory dismissal under section 521(i)); In re Lopez, No. 09-31511-C, 2009 
Bankr. LEXIS 3029 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Sept. 17, 2009) (adopting Spencer theory that 
“automatic dismissal” is not automatic, and “„effective on the 46th day‟ simply marks the 
date on which the court is deprived of such discretion”); In re Spencer, 388 B.R. 418, 422-
23 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2008) (The phrase “automatically dismissed” in § 521(i)(1) only means 
that the debtor is not permitted to defeat the motion by arguing that the failure to timely file 
the documents required by § 521(a)(1) constitutes insufficient cause for dismissal, and the 
46th day is not the date on which the dismissal itself is effective, but rather, the date 
effective as of which the court is divested of the discretion to deny a request for dismissal.); 
In re Ackerman, 374 B.R. 65, 66 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 2007) (refusing dismissal by “ordering 
otherwise” even though trustee‟s request does not meet the requirements of § 521(i)(4)); In 
re Withers, No. 06-42098, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 663 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2007) 
(excusing after the forty-five day period the requirement to file schedules). 
 82. Cases dismissed effective 46th day:  In re Calhoun, 359 B.R. 738, 741 (Bankr. E.D. 
Mo. 2007); Warren v. Wirum, 378 B.R. 640, 647 (N.D. Cal. 2007); In re Cloud, 356 B.R. 
544 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2006); In re Dienberg, 348 B.R. 482, 483 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2006) 
(request for entry of order under § 521(i)(2) is merely a request for a comfort order).  
Automatic means automatic:  In re Turner, 384 B.R. 852 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2008); In re 
Richardson, No. 07-42881, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 229 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2008); In re 
Hall, 368 B.R. 595 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007); In re Calhoun, 359 B.R. 738, 741 (Bankr. 
E.D. Mo. 2007); In re Reyes, No. 06-32767, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 358 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 
Jan. 31, 2007); In re Fawson, 338 B.R. 505, 510 (Bankr. D. Utah 2006); In re Rubio, No. 
06-50065, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 2846 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2006); In re Winston, No. 
07-24447-D-11, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2835 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2007); In re Conner, 
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one court siding with the abusive debtor.
83
  One judge recognized the 
theory advanced by Parker to be unsupportable, but nevertheless decided it 
was better to be labeled a judicial activist than to allow the debtor to abuse 
the bankruptcy system: 
Regardless [of mandatory statute], this court will not allow 
dishonest debtors to abuse the court system despite Congress‟ 
direction that courts “shall” dismiss bankruptcy cases when tax 
returns are not timely provided to the trustee.  In fact, this is the 
first time in twenty-five years on the bench that the court has 
blatantly disregarded the strict language of a statute to achieve 
the outcome desired.  This apparently makes the undersigned an 
activist judge in every sense of the word.  So, this court chooses 
to deny the debtor‟s motion, and an appellate court is welcome to 
reverse and apply the law as written if they so choose.
84
 
B.   The Year-to-Date Payment Advice Exception 
The requirement to file payment advice statements is the second area 
to develop a major judicial exception to the statutory automatic dismissal 
rules.  The recipe for this exception was written before the law went into 
effect in an important article by Harry J. Sommer, a prominent consumer 
bankruptcy attorney, and editor-in-chief of the preeminent bankruptcy 
treatise, Collier on Bankruptcy.
85
  He wrote “[i]ndeed, a year-to-date figure 
on a current pay stub may be considered to be evidence of payment 




This one sentence in Sommer‟s article has created a cottage industry 
in the bankruptcy courts.
87
  The theory is that § 521(a) requires the filing of 
 
No. 06-40061-LMK, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 1224 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. May 16, 2006); In re 
Williams, 339 B.R. 794 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006); In re Ott, 343 B.R. 264 (Bankr. D. Colo. 
2006); In re Cloud, 356 B.R. 544, 545 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2006); In re Smith, 352 B.R. 729, 
730 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 2006).  A few courts simply held that the court had the inherent 
discretion to deny dismissal.  See, e.g., In re Brickey, 363 B.R. 59, 66 (Bankr. N.D. N.Y. 
2007) (court has discretion to annul automatic dismissal); In re Walker, No. 06-10879, 2006 
Bankr. LEXIS 4330 (Bankr. D. Md. July 20, 2006).  See also In re Wassah, 417 B.R. 175 
(Bankr E.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that exercise of discretion to “order otherwise” after forty-
five day period should only be applied in abusive debtor cases). 
 83. In re Hall, 368 B.R. 595 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007). 
 84. In re Fileccia, No. 06-05111, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1924, at *11 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 
June 6, 2007). 
 85. Harry J. Sommer, Trying to Make Sense Out of Nonsense: Representing Consumers 
Under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 191 (2005). 
 86. Id. at 213. 
 87. In re Tay-Kwamya, 367 B.R. 422, 426-27 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (Debtor‟s 
declaration stating numbers that would be on missing pay stubs sufficient:  “Henry J. 
GERMAINFINALIZED_ONE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/28/2011  7:33 PM 
566 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 13:3 
 
specific “documents,” while the automatic dismissal rule of § 521(i) applies 
to “information.”  Therefore, dismissal should not be required if sufficient 
“information” is contained in other filed documents to disclose the 
substance of the information contained in missing documents required by § 
521(a)(1).  The vast majority
88
 of courts readily accepted this theory to 
excuse missing payment advice statements as long as the year-to-date totals 
were on file.
89
  Only when the last pay stub is missing, and therefore no 
year-to-date totals containing the missing information are available, will 
the courts dismiss.  As long as the missing statement is a “donut hole”—
one of the middle statements whose information can be gleaned from the 
year-to-date totals—dismissal can be denied.  However, if the final pay 
stub is not filed, or does not contain year-to-date information, the case must 
be dismissed.
90
  Despite the liberality in accepting year-to-date information 
(or even a schedule of the missing stubs), the courts have not excused 
 
Sommer anticipated this problem, and suggested its solution, prior to the effective date of 
BAPCPA.”). 
 88. A few courts, without much reasoning, refused to accept the year-to-date theory.  
See In re Landers, No. 06-22265, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 2272 (Bankr. D. Utah 2006) (neither 
year-to-date totals nor debtor‟s testimony that he did not remember receiving missing 
statement were relevant).  In In re Kruitbosch, No. 07-22203, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 3451 
(Bankr. D. Utah Aug. 29, 2007), the court rejected the year-to-date theory, choosing to rely 
on the bankruptcy court‟s decision in In re Miller, 371 B.R. 509 (Bankr. D. Utah 2007), 
over the then more recent appellate opinion from the same jurisdiction, In re Svigel, No. 
WY-07-020, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1977, at *5-6 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2007), which adopted the 
year-to-date theory.  Shortly thereafter, the bankrupt court‟s opinion in Miller was reversed 
on appeal.  See discussion of In re Miller, 383 B.R. 767, 772 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2008), infra 
note 93. 
 89. See, e.g., In re Richardson, 406 B.R. 586 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2009) (single final pay 
stub sufficient if it contains year-to-date totals, even though all remaining pay stubs not 
timely filed, as long as debtor acts in good faith and reasonably provides missing pay stubs 
upon request); In re Miller, 383 B.R. 767, 772 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2008) (finding year-to-date 
totals sufficient to reverse bankruptcy court‟s dismissal, court decides debtor‟s due process 
arguments are moot); In re Riffle, No. 07-22372, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 673, at *1 (Bankr. 
W.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2008) (single final pay stub with year-to-date totals sufficient to deny 
dismissal); In re Wojda, 371 B.R. 656, 660 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2007) (“[D]ismissal only 
results upon the failure to file the underlying information.”) (emphasis added); In re Svigel, 
No. WY-07-020, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1977, at *5-6 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. June 18, 2007) 
(remanding to bankruptcy court to consider whether all “information” in the missing 
statements available through year-to-date totals); In re Reynolds, 370 B.R. 393 (Bankr. N.D. 
Okla. 2007); In re Luders, 356 B.R. 671 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2006). 
 90. See, e.g., In re Catania, 397 B.R. 667 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2008) (distinguishing In re 
Wojda because all information was not contained in payment advices); In re Scalise, No. 
08-61739, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 2983 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2008) (dismissal mandatory 
where final pay stubs not filed, even though excusable error and debtors would suffer undue 
harm from dismissal, and even though stubs received from employer after 60 day period 
preceding bankruptcy).  See also In re Williams, No. 08-80292, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 3303 
(Bankr. E.D. Okla. Aug. 22, 2008) (bank records showing payroll receipts not sufficient, 
because the records do not show all of the information contained in the paystubs). 
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There is a serious statutory problem with the theory that the court can 
excuse the failure to file payment advice statements, and deem the case to 
have not been dismissed, if other information on file contains the same 
information as the missing statements.  While it is true that § 521(a) 
requires the filing of specific documents, it is not true that § 521(i) requires 
automatic dismissal only if the debtor fails to file the information that 
would be contained in the documents.  On the contrary, § 521(i) requires 
automatic dismissal for failing “to file all of the information required by 
subsection (a)(1) within 45 days after the date of the filing of the 
petition.”
92
  The specific documents are the “information required by 
subsection (a)(1).”  The statute does not say “the information that would be 
contained in the documents required by subsection (a)(1).”  The statute 
defines the “information” to be the documents required by subsection 
(a)(1).  Unfortunately (for those who believe the automatic dismissal rules 
are misguided), the judicially created exception for year-to-date totals is 
grounded on a faulty reading of the statutory language. 
The bankruptcy court‟s opinion in In re Miller,
93
 later reversed by the 
bankruptcy appellate panel,
94
 is the only reasoned opinion attacking the 
 
 91. A number of courts have enacted local rules requiring the debtor to provide 
payment advice statements to the trustee rather than filing them with the court in accordance 
with the statute.  In In re Barajas, No. 06-10598-B-13, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3095 (Bankr. 
E.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2006), a creditor argued that the case was automatically dismissed because 
the statements were not filed by the court within the forty-five day period as required by 
statute, but were instead provided to the trustee in accordance with the local rule.  The court 
ruled that the local rule constituted an “order otherwise” under § 521(a)(1)(B), excusing the 
statutory requirement to file payment advice statements.  Id.  What happens in a jurisdiction 
with such a local rule if the debtor fails to provide the statements to the trustee in 
accordance with the local rule?  After all, violations of local rules do not require automatic 
dismissal.  Does the local rule obviate the automatic dismissal rules with respect to payment 
advice statements?  Two courts have held that the statutory rule required mandatory 
dismissal if the payment advices were not timely provided to the trustee, even though the 
local rule substituted delivery to the trustee for filing with the court.  In re Miller, No. 06-
11566, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 4378 (Bankr. D. Md. June 9, 2006); In re Lovato, 343 B.R. 268, 
270 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2006) (same, admin order) (“Had the [statute] . . . left the Court with 
any discretion, the Court would deny the Chapter 7 Trustee‟s motion with leave to allow the 
Debtor to submit the required payment advices.  Furthermore, the Court would require the 
Chapter 7 Trustee to request copies of the payment advices at the § 341 meeting of 
creditors.  Instead, the Debtor‟s case must be dismissed because BAPCPA leaves the Court 
with no discretion to fashion any reasonable or equitable solution.”).  These cases may well 
be carrying out the intent of Congress in enacting the automatic dismissal rules, but if the 
local rule relieves the filing requirement under § 521(a)(1)(B), then the automatic dismissal 
provision in § 521(i) would be entirely inapplicable. 
 92. 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(1) (2010) (emphasis added). 
 93. 371 B.R. 509 (Bankr. D. Utah 2007). 
 94. In re Miller, 383 B.R. 767 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2008). 
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year-to-date exception.  The Miller court took an entirely different tack 
than the other courts that had distinguished between the documents 
required by § 521(a)(1), and the “information” referred to in § 521(i)(1).  
Instead, the Miller court (presumably at the behest of the debtor‟s lawyer) 
focused on the language of the provision requiring payment advices to be 
filed:  § 521(a)(1)(B)(4), which requires the debtor to file “[c]opies of all 
payment advices or other evidence of payment received within 60 days 
before the date of the filing of the petition, by the debtor from any 
employer of the debtor.”
95
  The issue addressed by the court was whether 
the “or other evidence of payment” language would allow year-to-date 
totals, or the re-creation of the missing pay stub made by the debtor, to 
substitute for the actual payment advices.  The court parsed the language 
carefully, noting that the only verb, “received,” modified both “payment 
advices” and “other evidence.”  Thus, the court concluded that the language 
required either copies of the actual payment advices or copies of whatever 
other evidence the debtor received from his employer—not the debtor‟s 
own recreation (and not year-to-date totals).
96
  It is difficult to argue with 
the court‟s analysis.  In the Miller case, neither the bankruptcy court, nor 
the bankruptcy appellate panel that reversed the bankruptcy court‟s 
decision, considered the prevailing theory that the “information” required 
to avoid automatic dismissal under § 521(i) was different from the 




 95. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv). 
 96. In re Miller, 371 B.R. 509, 514-15 (Bankr. D. Utah 2007) (“The only coherent and 
consistent reading of the statute has the verb „received‟ taking the subject nouns „advices‟ 
and „evidence,‟ which themselves are part of a prepositional phrase modifying the word 
„copies.‟  Under this reading, debtors have to file copies of one of two things—either „all 
payment advices‟ received from an employer within the 60-day prepetition period or „all . . . 
other evidence of payment‟ received from an employer within the 60-day prepetition period. 
. . .  And it does no good in this case to assert that the year-to-date information contained in 
the January 20, 2007 payment advice somehow substitutes as the actual January 5, 2007 
payment advice, arguing that it provides evidence by extrapolation of the content of the 
actual missing payment advice.  An extrapolation made by Debtors‟ counsel or the Court is 
not evidence received from the employer.”). 
 97. In reversing the bankruptcy court, the bankruptcy appellate panel in Miller ruled 
that “other evidence of payment” need not come from the employer, because employers do 
not issue anything concerning payroll other than payment advice statements.  In re Miller, 
383 B.R. 767 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2008).  Therefore, the court reasoned, the bankruptcy court‟s 
careful parsing of the language would read out the “other evidence of payment” language 
from the statute.  Id. at 771 (“It is difficult to imagine what type of evidence, other than a 
debtor‟s payment advices, would satisfy this reading of the statute.  In other words, the 
bankruptcy court‟s interpretation makes the „other evidence of payment‟ option effectively 
non-existent.”).  The bankruptcy appellate panel‟s premise is faulty.  An employer could 
issue at the debtor‟s request, for example, a historical payroll summary showing all of the 
amounts for each payroll period.  Indeed, it is likely common for employers to provide 
schedules rather than the actual payment advices when requested to recreate historical 
payroll information.  Congress clearly wanted the information to come from the employer, 
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Another ambiguity in the statutory language is whether only those 
payment advices received within sixty days of bankruptcy must be filed, or 
whether all payment advices reflecting “income” earned within sixty days 
of bankruptcy must be filed, even if the advices were received later.  This is 
important where the debtor did not receive payment advices, or where the 
payment advices were received after bankruptcy but covered income 
earned during the sixty-day period before bankruptcy.  Two courts 
considering the question have reached different results.
98
  As the 
bankruptcy court in Miller correctly concluded, there is only one verb—
”received”—and therefore the statutory language can only be properly 
interpreted to refer to documents received by the debtor within sixty days 
of bankruptcy, regardless of when the income was paid.
99
 
C.   Violating Einstein‟s Theory of Relativity by “Ordering Otherwise” 
Albert Einstein theorized that a person could go back in time only by 
traveling faster than the speed of light.
100
  Unfortunately, according to his 
theory of relativity, it would take an infinite amount of energy to move a 
stationary object faster than the speed of light.
101
  While physicists have 
 
and not to be created by the employee, in order to assure its validity.  There is no similar 
reason to prefer separate statements to a schedule provided by the employer. 
 98. Compare In re Mitchell, 367 B.R. 370, 371 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2007) (statute only 
requires payment advices or other evidence of payment that were received by the debtor 
during the sixty days before bankruptcy to be filed) with In re Scalise, No. 08-61739, 2008 
Bankr. LEXIS 2983, at *3-5 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2008) (debtor argued that at the time 
of filing, the debtor had yet to receive a pay stub covering the date of filing.  However, there 
is no assertion that within the subsequent forty-five day period he was unable to obtain and 
file the pay stub for the period.).  Interestingly, the court in Scalise relied on the bankruptcy 
appellate panel‟s liberal decision in Miller, supra note 93, to deny relief to a debtor who in 
fact met the strictures of the statute.  In fact, the bankruptcy appellate panel‟s opinion in 
Miller addressed the meaning of “other evidence of payment”; it did not consider the timing 
issue raised by the Scalise case. 
 99. In re Miller, 383 B.R. at 767. 
 100. See Mark Jarrell, The Special Theory of Relativity, 
http://www.phys.lsu.edu/~jarrell/COURSES/ELECTRODYNAMICS/Chap11/chap11.pdf 
(Nov. 9, 2001) (If one were able to move information or matter from one point to another 
faster than light, then according to special relativity, there would be some inertial frame of 
reference in which the signal or object is moving backward in time.  Whether someone 
traveling faster than the speed of light would actually go backward in time, or would only be 
able to see events that occurred earlier in time, is a subject beyond the scope of this article). 
 101. See U.S. Dep‟t of Energy, Ask a Scientist Physics Archive, Einstein Light Speed 
Questions, http://www.newton.dep.anl.gov/askasci/phy99/phy99214.htm (“According to our 
present understanding, it is not possible to move faster than the speed of light.”); Scott I. 
Chase, Tachyons Entry from Usenet Physics FAQ, 
http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/physics/ParticleAndNuclear/tachyons.html (According to 
special relativity it would take an infinite amount of energy to accelerate a slower-than-light 
object to the speed of light.  And, although relativity does not forbid the theoretical 
possibility of tachyons, which move faster than light at all times, when analyzed using 
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since speculated that black holes or some other phenomenon might allow 




Unlike physical matter, court orders can go back in time in limited 
circumstances.  For example, courts can enter orders “nunc pro tunc,” 
giving them retroactive effectiveness, but only to correct errors by 
reflecting what the court actually intended to do at the earlier time.
103
 
If a case has already been “automatically dismissed,” may the court 
undismiss the case, retroactively, through the magic of judicial decree?  
And if so, would the undismissal be retroactive or only prospective (similar 
to a reinstatement), resulting in a gap during which the case did not exist? 
In 2009, the bad debtor cases—the attempts by debtors who were 
abusing the bankruptcy process to seek to obtain the dismissal of their own 
case through their own failure to file required documents—began reaching 
the courts of appeals.  To prevent debtors from abusing the bankruptcy 
system, the appellate courts quickly recognized the courts‟ power to relieve 
the filing requirements by “ordering otherwise” under § 521(a)(1)(B), even 
after the case had been “automatically dismissed” at the end of the forty-
five day period. 
In In re Warren,
104
 Mr. Warren filed for bankruptcy, without filing any 
of the required schedules, after his ex-wife garnished his bank account.  
The court notified Warren that his case would be dismissed unless he 
timely filed his schedules.
105
  Warren did not respond to the court‟s notice, 
and so the court set a hearing on the dismissal of the case (although under 
the statute no hearing was required because the case was “automatically 
dismissed”).
106
  The trustee objected to the dismissal of the case because 
she needed time to investigate the debtor‟s bankruptcy filing and financial 




quantum field theory it seems that it would not actually be possible to use them to transmit 
information faster than light, and there is no evidence for their existence.). 
 102. See Time Travel, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time_travel (discussing 
various theories). 
 103. See, e.g., In re Warren, 568 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting United 
States v. Sumner, 226 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 2000)) (Nunc pro tunc “is limited to 
making the record reflect what the . . . court actually intended to do at an earlier date, but 
which it did not sufficiently express or did not accomplish due to some error or 
inadvertence.”); Kusay v. United States, 62 F.3d 192, 193 (7th Cir. 1995) (“The power to 
correct erroneous records does not imply ability to revise the substance of what transpired or 
to back-date events.”); In re Singson, 41 F.3d 316, 318 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Such a recension is 
available as a matter of right; no judge would insist on an „extraordinary‟ justification for 
conforming the paper record to decisions actually taken.”). 
 104. In re Warren, 568 F.3d at 1115. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
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Warren, seeking to avoid the trustee‟s scrutiny, argued that dismissal was 
automatic and mandatory because he had not filed his own schedules 
within the forty-five day period, which had now passed.
108
 
Similarly, in In re Acosta-Rivera,
109
 the debtors filed for bankruptcy 
without filing their required payment advice statements or their statement 
of monthly income, and without properly disclosing the existence of the 
pending wrongful termination lawsuit that had been filed against their 
former employer.  After discovering the lawsuit, the trustee negotiated and 
sought approval for a settlement of the lawsuit that would pay all creditors 
in full, but at a price significantly lower than the debtors wanted.
110
  The 
debtors sought to have their own case dismissed under the automatic 
dismissal rules, due to their own failure to file the required statements 
within the statutory forty-five day period.
111
  As in Warren, the trustee 
objected to a dismissal.
112
 
In both Warren and Acosta-Rivera, the bankruptcy courts ruled that 
they had and would exercise the discretion not to dismiss the cases by 
retroactively excusing the debtor‟s filing deficiencies, even after the forty-
five day period had expired, under § 521(a)(1)(B).
113
  In both cases, the 
district courts disagreed on appeal, holding that the automatic dismissal 
rules prevented the bankruptcy courts from excusing the filing defects after 
the forty-five day period.
114
 
Finally, in both cases, the courts of appeal reversed the district courts 
and affirmed the bankruptcy courts‟ authority and decisions to refuse to 
dismiss the cases.  The theory for denying dismissal was the same in both 
cases, summed up in this quote from In re Warren: 
Interpreting § 521 to grant authority to “order[ ] otherwise” even 
after § 521(i)(1)‟s forty-five day filing deadline has passed not 
only furthers congressional intent, but also preserves “the 
authentic value of automatic dismissal.”  When a party moves for 
an order dismissing an incomplete petition, the court can do one 
of three things:  (1) dismiss the case, (2) decline to dismiss the 
case if an exception applies, or (3) determine, in its discretion, 
that the missing information is not required or that denial of 
dismissal is necessary to prevent a debtor from abusing and 
manipulating the bankruptcy system. This approach recognizes 
that the missing information may or may not be required, in a 
practical sense, depending upon what is deemed material by the 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. 557 F.3d 8, 10 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 110. Id. at 10-11. 
 111. Id. at 10. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Warren, 568 F.3d at 1116; Acosta-Rivera, 557 F.3d at 11. 
 114. Id. 
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If the bankruptcy court has the power to retroactively “order 
otherwise” in the bad debtor cases, why do they not have the same power 
for debtors who make innocent, excusable and harmless mistakes?
116
  If 
taken to its logical extreme, the power to “order otherwise” after the 
expiration of the forty-five day period would swallow the “automatic 
dismissal” rule in one gulp, restoring judicial discretion to a statutory 
procedure intended to eliminate it. 
While the policy justifications advanced by the two courts of appeal in 
Acosta-Rivera and Warren are compelling, the statutory analysis is 
wanting.  The manifest purpose of the “automatic dismissal” statute was to 
deny judicial discretion when the required papers are not filed within the 
forty-five day period (or up to a ninety-day period if the debtor timely 
requests an extension of time).  “Automatic dismissal” has no meaning if 




D.   The Supreme Court Rules Against Backward Time Travel 
The Supreme Court has recently in dicta rejected the concept of 
backward time travel to un-dismiss the automatically dismissed case by 
retroactively relieving the filing requirement.  The issue in Hamilton v. 
 
 115. In re Warren, 568 F.3d at 1118-19 (citations to In Re Acosta-Rivera omitted).  
Accord In re Amir, No. 08-13700, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 1522 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Mar. 17, 
2009) (denying an attempt by debtor abusing bankruptcy process to dismiss his own case, 
following Acosta v. Rivera); In re Scotto, No. 809-75956-reg, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1370 
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2010) (refusing to dismiss a bizarre bankruptcy case in which 
paralegal forged debtor‟s signature on skeletal bankruptcy petition because debtor did not 
repudiate paralegal‟s actions quickly enough). 
 116. See, e.g., In re Taylor, No. A09-63120-PWB, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 792 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ga. Mar. 25, 2009) (noting ability to “order otherwise” to excuse late filing of payment 
advices if creditor sought to obtain dismissal of case on technicality); In re McCarver, No. 
06-10603-WHD, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 4718 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. May 31, 2006) (excusing late 
payment advices by “ordering otherwise” where no objection to debtor‟s motion).  See also 
In re Aiello, 428 B.R. 296 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that creditor did not request 
dismissal under 521(i), and that any request under (i) would be moot because the deficiency 
had been cured, even though the cure occurred after the forty-five day period, and thus after 
the case was “automatically dismissed”). 
 117. It is worth noting that the court of appeals in Warren rejected the bankruptcy court‟s 
attempt to enter its order forgiving the filing requirement nunc pro tunc, or retroactively, to 
come within the forty-five day period even though the issue was first raised, and the order 
was first entered, after the forty-five day period.  The court of appeals correctly ruled that an 
order may be entered nunc pro tunc only if the court intended at the earlier time to enter the 
order, but through inadvertence or error the order was not timely entered.  See Warren, 568 
F.3d at 1116 n.1. 
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 concerned the interpretation of the Chapter 13 rule that debtors 
must pay all of their “projected disposable income” during the plan period 
to creditors.
119
  The Bankruptcy Code defines “disposable income” by 
taking “current monthly income”—the debtor‟s average income during the 
six months before bankruptcy
120
—and subtracting either the IRS allowed 
expenses for debtors who had current monthly income above the median in 
their state, or amounts “reasonably necessary to be expended . . . for . . . 




The debtor in Lanning received a one-time buyout from her employer 
during the six-month period preceding bankruptcy, causing her to be an 
above-median debtor with “disposable income” greatly in excess of her 
expected post-bankruptcy income.
122
  If her statutorily-calculated 
“disposable income” were to be “projected” forward during the plan term, 
her required plan payments would be so high that she would be unable to 
confirm or complete a Chapter 13 plan.  The debtor in Lanning argued that 
the use of the term “projected” gives the court the discretion to adjust the 
statutorily-calculated “disposable income” for changed circumstances.
123
  
All of the justices, except Justice Scalia, agreed with the debtor‟s argument, 
allowing the court to adjust the statutorily calculated “disposable income” 




In arguing that the mechanical test should apply, the trustee in 
Lanning suggested that debtors who have changed circumstances could ask 
the court to excuse or delay the filing of the debtor‟s income and expense 
schedule, and then seek to have “current monthly income” determined on 
the basis of a later six-month period (after the statement is eventually filed, 
for example), rather than the six-month period preceding the bankruptcy 
petition.
125
  The definition of “disposable income” allows the court to 
determine the amount if the debtor filed the required means test statement 
late or, with the court‟s permission, not at all.
126
  The Supreme Court 
rejected the trustee‟s argument by noting that § 521(i)(3) allows at most 
only an additional forty-five days to file the schedule, and would require a 
motion to be filed within the initial forty-five day period, and therefore 
 
 118. 130 S. Ct. 2464 (2010). 
 119. Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (2010). 
 120. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A). 
 121. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2). 
 122. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. at 2470. 
 123. Id. at 2471. 
 124. Id. at 2471-74. 
 125. Id. at 2476-77. 
 126. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A)(A) (2010) (defining the time period and filing 
requirement to derive a debtor‟s “current monthly income”). 
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would not help debtors like Ms. Lanning.
127
  The Supreme Court‟s 
statement conflicts with the theory advanced by the courts of appeal in 
Warren and Acosta-Rivera that the bankruptcy court could relieve the filing 
requirement after the forty-five day (or upon timely request by the debtor, 
ninety-day) period after the bankruptcy filing.
128
 
Justice Scalia‟s dissent in Lanning opposed the majority ruling on the 
merits, contending that the bankruptcy court could permanently excuse the 
requirement to file an income and expense statement, as long as it did so 
within the forty-five day (or, if a timely motion filed by the debtor is 
granted by the court, ninety-day) period following bankruptcy.
129
  
However, even Scalia rejected the argument that had been accepted by the 
courts of appeal in Warren and Acosta-Rivera—that the extension could be 
granted after the case had been automatically dismissed: 
But the statute appears to assume that a court may excuse the 
filing of such a schedule altogether:  A debtor is required to file a 
schedule in the first instance “unless the court orders otherwise,” 
§ 521(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). And § 101(10A)(A)(ii)‟s 
provision of a method for calculating current monthly income “if 
the debtor does not file the schedule of current income required 
by section 521(a)(1)(B)(ii)” makes little sense unless a court can 
excuse the failure to do so, since an unexcused failure to do so 
would be a basis for dismissing the case, see § 521(i).  Allowing 
courts to excuse such schedules does not render superfluous § 
521(i)(3)‟s authorization for limited extensions, since that applies 
to extensions sought up to 45 days after the filing deadline, 
whereas § 521(a)(1)(B) seems to apply only before the 
 
 127. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. at 2477 n.6.  It is worth noting that bankruptcy courts have used 
the forty-five day extension to obtain a different period for calculating disposable income 
where the debtor suffered a significant drop in income from the six-month period preceding 
bankruptcy.  See In re Shelor, No. 08-80738C-13D, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 3974 (Bankr. 
M.D.N.C. Sept. 23, 2008) (noting that Court must use the six-month period from the date 
that the income determination is made, and cannot simply select any six-month period that 
the debtor may request); In re Cummisky, No. 08-01579-8-JRL, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 4061 
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. Mar. 17, 2008) (holding that in order to enable joint debtors to propose 
confirmable plan after one of the debtor‟s lost a job, court could strike filed means test form 
B22C, and allow debtor to file a revised form using actual post-petition income); In re 
McQueen, No. 07-03011-8-JRL, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 4591 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Dec. 21, 2007) 
(granting request to strike portions of petition showing disposable income during six months 
before bankruptcy, and directing new schedules to be filed, to more accurately reflect post-
bankruptcy ability to pay).  Presumably after the Supreme Court‟s decision in Lanning, this 
kind of manipulation of the debtor‟s filing data will no longer be necessary to achieve an 
appropriate bankruptcy result. 
 128. In re Acosta-Rivera, 557 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2009); In re Warren 568 F.3d 1113 (9th 
Cir. 2009). 
 129. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. at 2483 n.5. 
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Justice Scalia appears to have misread § 521(i)(3), which does not 
allow requests for extensions after the original forty-five day period.
131
  In 
any case, all of the justices, both the majority and Justice Scalia in dissent, 
rejected the argument that § 521(a)(1)(B) allows the court to excuse the 
filing requirement after the initial forty-five day (or if an extension is 
timely granted, ninety-day) period has passed.
132
  The Court of Appeals‟ 
theory in both Warren and Acosta-Rivera would turn an automatic 
dismissal into a discretionary one.  While this almost certainly would result 
in better judicial policy, it is simply not consistent with the statutory 
language and Congress‟s manifest intent.  After the Supreme Court‟s 
statements, it is difficult to see how the “order otherwise” language could 
be used after the forty-five day period to retroactively undismiss a case that 
has already been automatically dismissed. 
E.   Trustee Motions to Excuse Compliance 
There is one part of the statutory scheme that cannot be reconciled 
with the Supreme Court‟s view that the bankruptcy courts cannot go back 
in time to un-dismiss an automatically dismissed case by “ordering 
otherwise” after the forty-five day period has expired.  We have an overly-
aggressive small upstate New York credit union, bent on testing the limits 
of the automatic dismissal rules, to thank for bringing to light this statutory 
anomaly.  First, to demonstrate its over-aggressiveness, the credit union 
sought the dismissal of two bankruptcy cases because the debtors failed to 
indicate in their schedules whether or not they anticipated any increase in 
income or expenses during the year following bankruptcy.
133
 
The statute requires the filing of “a statement disclosing any 
reasonably anticipated increase in income or expenditures over the 12-
month period following the date of the filing of the petition . . . .”
134
  The 
bankruptcy courts in both cases held that that the statute only requires filing 
a statement if an increase is reasonably anticipated.  Since the debtors did 
not reasonably anticipate an increase in income in either case, they did not 
have to file anything during the 45-day period.
135
  The credit union 
 
 130. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 131. See 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(3)(2010) (“Upon request of the debtor made within 45 days 
after the date of the filing of the petition described in Paragraph (1) . . . .”). 
 132. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. at 2464. 
 133. CFCU Fed. Credit Union v. Frisbie, No. 06-CV-6596-CJS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
89464 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2009); CFCU Fed. Credit Union v. Pierce, No. 06-CV-6595-
CJS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61555 (W.D.N.Y. July 17, 2009). 
 134. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(vi). 
 135. Frisbie, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89464, at *6. 
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appealed both cases, apparently contending that the statute required the 
debtors to indicate whether they anticipated an increase in income or 
expenses, even if they did not anticipate an increase.  Both appeals were 
dismissed on procedural grounds.
136
 
It is to the credit union‟s third case, CFCU Community Credit Union 
v. Swimelar,
137
 that we owe a debt of gratitude for pointing out the statutory 
anomaly.  In Swimelar, the debtors filed six months of payment advice 
statements with their Chapter 13 petition, but due to oversight did not file 
payment advice statements for the five-week period preceding bankruptcy, 
as required by the statute.
138
  The credit union waited stealthily in the weeds 
until five days after the “automatic dismissal” period expired to pounce, by 
moving for an order declaring the case “automatically dismissed.”
139
  In 
response to the credit union‟s motion, a sympathetic trustee moved under § 
521(i)(4) to prevent dismissal, arguing that the debtor‟s error was 
inadvertent and harmless, and creditors would be better off with the 
administration of the case.
140
  The problem was that the trustee‟s motion 
was filed after the case had been “automatically dismissed” at the end of 
the forty-five day period.  Nevertheless, both the bankruptcy court and the 
district court refused to dismiss, and found the trustee‟s motion to be timely 
because it was brought within five days after the creditor‟s motion for 
dismissal was filed, even though both the creditor‟s motion and the 
trustee‟s opposition were filed after the case had been “automatically 
dismissed.”
141
  The courts simply interpreted the loose time reference in § 
521(i)(4) to validate the trustee‟s late motion.   
In dicta, the District Court stated that a strict interpretation of the 
automatic dismissal language would create due process problems.  It stated, 
“[w]hile this Court recognizes these potential problems arising from the 
statutory language, the Court ultimately finds that the interpretation 
suggested by those cases would lead, at times, to unduly harsh results, and 
possibly runs afoul of due process protections afforded by the 
 
 136. In re Frisbie was dismissed because CFCU did not prosecute the appeal.  Frisbie, 
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89464, at *7.  In re Pierce was dismissed because CFCU Federal 
Credit Union did not appeal from the order granting the debtor a discharge, mooting the 
appeal.  Pierce, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61555, at *8. 
 137. No. 6:07-CV-00341, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3991 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2008). 
 138. Swimelar, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3991, at *1-2.  It was not clear in the case 
whether the debtor received the payment advices during the 60-day period, as is required by 
a careful reading of the statute, or only received income during the 60-day period for which 
no payment advice statements were filed.  The court did not discuss this interpretative 
question, and assumed that the debtors were required to file the payment advice statements.  
Id.. 
 139. Id. at *4 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(1)). 
 140. Id. at *2. 
 141. Id. at *2, 19. 
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The District Court recognized that earlier courts had rejected its view 
that a trustee motion under § 521(a)(4), filed within five days after a 
creditor request for an order confirming dismissal but after the case was 




One of the contrary opinions cited by the District Court in Swimelar, 
In re Fawson,
144
 involved two separate cases in which the debtors failed to 
timely file their payment advice statements.  In both cases, the court 
scheduled a hearing to determine whether the debtors were required to file 
payment advice statements before entering an order of dismissal.  In 
response, the debtors quickly filed their missing payment advice 
statements.
145
  One of the debtors indicated that the payment advice 
statements had been delivered to his attorney, but through inadvertence the 
attorney had not filed them.
146
  The debtors argued that the court retained 
discretion not to dismiss the case.  The Fawson court disagreed: 
The section provides that the case is automatically dismissed on 
the 46th day if an individual debtor fails to file the § 521(a)(1) 
papers within 45 days of filing the petition.  Automatic means 
“acting or operating in a manner essentially independent of 
external influence or control.”  Section 521(i)(1) does not 
contemplate any independent action by the Court or any other 
party—the case is merely dismissed by operation of the statute 
itself.  There is no ambiguity.
147
 
In a footnote, the court also rejected the argument that Congress really 
did not intend automatic dismissal because § 521(i)(4) would allow the 
trustee to seek to have the case continued even after it had been 
automatically dismissed: 
The only discretion built into § 521(i) is found in subsections (3) 
and (4), discussed below, which allow courts to enlarge the time 
to file § 521(a)(1) papers upon the timely request of the debtor or 
the trustee. The Court has no discretion to enlarge the time to file 
§ 521(a)(1) documents after the 45-day period has expired 
because by operation of the statute, the case is already 
 
 142. See id. at *10. 
 143. Id. at *9-10 (citing In re Fawson, 338 B.R. 505, 511 (Bankr. D. Utah 2006) and 
Rivera v. Miranda, 376 B.R. 382, 386 (D. Puerto Rico 2007)).  Rivera was later overturned 
by the appellate court, which allowed the bankruptcy court to retroactively relieve the filing 
requirement.  See In re Acosta-Rivera, 557 F.3d 8, 9 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 144. In re Fawson, 338 B.R. at 510. 
 145. Id. at 507. 
 146. Id. at 508. 
 147. Id. at 510. 
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The court also ruled that it had no discretion to grant more time or 
relieve the default once the case had been automatically dismissed under § 
521(i)(1).
149
  The comments in Fawson concerning § 521(i)(4) are entirely 
dicta, because the case was dismissed on the court‟s own motion without 
the filing of either a creditor request for dismissal or a timely trustee 
motion to excuse the filing requirement.  But what it means for a court to 
deny an order of dismissal when a case has been “automatically dismissed” 
remains a statutory mystery. 
The court in In re Spencer
150
 completed the half circle left by 
Swimelar, ruling that the “automatic dismissal” language in § 521(a)(1) 
should be rendered meaningless because it would otherwise prevent the 
trustee exception from having meaning.
151
  In Spencer, the court entered an 
order dismissing a debtor‟s bankruptcy case for failing to comply with the 
filing requirements.
152
  The court then raised sua sponte the issue whether 
the dismissal occurred automatically when the forty-five day “automatic 
dismissal” period had passed under § 521(i)(1), or only later when the court 
finally entered an order dismissing the case.
153
  The court ruled that since it 
still had authority after the forty-five day automatic dismissal period either 
to relieve the default under § 521(a), or to grant a trustee motion under § 
521(i)(4), the “automatic dismissal” was not really automatic, and therefore 
dismissal does not occur until the court actually enters a dismissal order.
154
  
The Spencer court‟s ruling, if followed, would render the “automatic 
dismissal” language entirely meaningless.  The exception would swallow 
the rule, even when the exception does not apply! 
Although there has been a strong push by appellate courts to exploit 
imperfections in the statutory language to give the bankruptcy courts broad 
discretion to prevent “automatic dismissal,” most of these decisions are not 
consistent with the statutory language itself.  Manifestly, Congress intended 
to eliminate judicial discretion by providing for automatic dismissal, and by 
setting forth very limited grounds for relief from that automatic dismissal.  
As the Supreme Court has made clear in its Lanning dicta, a court can only 
forgive the filing requirement if requested to do so within the initial forty-
five days of the case (or within ninety days if the debtor files a request for 
extension within the initial forty-five day period).  After that, the case is 
automatically dismissed and the court cannot render relief, except maybe in 
 
 148. Id. at 510 n.10. 
 149. Id. at 515. 
 150. 388 B.R. 418 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2008). 
 151. Id. at 420-21. 
 152. Id. at 421. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 422. 
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the limited circumstance identified in Swimelar—a timely trustee 
opposition to a request for an order of dismissal. 
The district court in Swimelar correctly recognized a problem with the 
circular language in § 521(i)(1), (2) and (4).  If a creditor or other party-in-
interest requests entry of an order of dismissal under § 521(i)(2) after the 
case has been “automatically dismissed,” and if the trustee within five days 
after such request files a motion asking the court not to dismiss the case, 
the court may decline dismissal if the court finds (1) the debtor attempted in 
good faith to comply with the filing requirement, and (2) the best interest of 
creditors would be served by administering the case.
155
  This is a very 
limited exception.  It applies only if the trustee takes affirmative action on 
the debtor‟s behalf, and the court makes the required findings.  The statute 
fails to tell us what happens when a case has been “automatically 
dismissed” under (i)(1), yet the court denies dismissal under (i)(4).  The 
statute would make much more sense if Congress had provided that the 
case would be “reinstated” upon the trustee‟s request, and perhaps that is 
the best way to reconcile the inconsistency.  The attempt by the court in 
Spencer to bootstrap this very limited exception into a general invalidation 
of the automatic dismissal language is surely unsupported by any notion of 
congressional intent or statutory interpretation.  If the automatic dismissal 
language is to be invalidated, something more than the limited exception in 
§ 521(i)(4) is needed. 
Thus, many bankruptcy courts have tried to address the unfairness of 
the automatic dismissal rules by exploiting ambiguities in the statutory 
language, or by interpreting the limited exceptions to swallow the general 
rule.  But the “shall be automatically dismissed effective on the 46th 
day”
156
 language is not reasonably susceptible to the argument that it is 
neither mandatory nor automatic, and does not require dismissal effective 
on the forty-sixth day.  The exceptions may be interpreted broadly when 
they apply, but they cannot swallow the general rule when they do not 
apply.  Congress‟s intent to provide for automatic dismissal is clear.  If 
automatic dismissal rules are to be invalidated, the power of Congress to 
enact those rules must be challenged. 
IV.   PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that 
no individual shall be deprived of “life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.”
157
  The Supreme Court has long held that “due process” 
embodies both a substantive element (discussed in Part V of this article) 
 
 155. 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(4). 
 156. Id. 
 157. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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and a procedural element—that the law be implemented in a fair manner.
158
  
However, in order for due process protection to apply, there must first be a 
deprivation of “life, liberty or property.”  The first question, then, is 
whether the government, by dismissing the debtor‟s bankruptcy case 
without a hearing, has deprived the debtor of “property.”
159
 
Early in the twentieth century, the Court attempted to draw the kind of 
constitutional distinction between “rights” and “privileges” exemplified in 
Miller, ruling that due process only applied to the deprivation of “rights.”  
So, famously, when a policeman was fired from his job for political 
activities, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote: “[t]he petitioner may have 
a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be 
a policeman.”
160
  The Court also allowed public universities to discriminate 
in admissions because college admission was a “privilege” not a “right.”
161
 
“This view was at least formally ended as the justices began to realize 
that, unless the government were required to accord fair treatment of 
individual interests that could not be termed „rights,‟ there would be almost 
no check on the power of government to limit individual freedom in 
society.”
162
  After a long period of erosion, the “rights” versus “privileges” 
distinction was formally replaced with the concept of “entitlement” in the 
early 1970s.
163
  Now “when the government acts to dispense benefits, it 
 
 158. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 
U.S. 319, 332-33 (1976). 
 159. See, e.g., Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59 (1999) (“The first 
inquiry in every due process challenge is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a 
protected interest in „property‟ or „liberty.‟ . . .  Only after finding the deprivation of a 
protected interest do we look to see if the State‟s procedures comport with due process.”) 
(internal citations omitted); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 332. 
 160. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892), abrogated by 
Pereira v. Comm‟r of Soc. Serv., 733 N.E.2d 112, 117 (Mass. 2000). 
 161. See Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 264 (1934) (allowing 
Regents to require “able bodied student[s]” to take courses in military tactics, and 
dismissing challenges by conscientious objectors:  “The privilege of the native-born 
conscientious objector to avoid bearing arms comes, not from the Constitution, but from the 
acts of Congress.  That body may grant or withhold the exemption as in its wisdom it sees 
fit; and, if it be withheld, the native-born conscientious objector cannot successfully assert 
the privilege.”). 
 162. JOHN E. NOWACK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 595 (Thompson-
West 7th ed. 2000) [hereinafter NOWACK & ROTUNDA]. 
 163. Id. at 620.  Accord Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971) (“[T]his Court 
now has rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental 
benefit is characterized as a „right‟ or as a „privilege.‟”).  See also Board of Regents v. Roth, 
408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (“To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must 
have more than an abstract need or desire for it.  He must have more than a unilateral 
expectation of it.  He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.  It is a 
purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon which people rely 
in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined.  It is a purpose of the 
constitutional right to a hearing to provide an opportunity for a person to vindicate those 
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must conform to the restrictions of the Constitution, which means that it 
may not deprive someone of an interest to which they are otherwise entitled 
without a procedure to determine the basis for the deprivation.”
164
 
It is therefore irrelevant that an individual has no constitutional right 
to file a bankruptcy petition or receive a discharge in the absence of a 
congressionally created benefit.  Once Congress has created a bankruptcy 
system and given qualified individuals an expectation of receiving benefits 
under it, Congress cannot deprive particular individuals of their right to 
receive continuing benefits without providing them with due process.
165
 
Prior to being reversed on appeal on other grounds, the bankruptcy 
court in Miller stated that the dismissal of the debtor‟s bankruptcy case, 
even without due process, would deprive the debtor of no interest in 
property, because bankruptcy is not a constitutional right: 
[T]here is no such federally protected property interest at stake in 
this case.  The Supreme Court has long held that “[t]here is no 
constitutional right to obtain a discharge of one‟s debts in 
bankruptcy.” The nation‟s bankruptcy laws are a matter of 
legislative largesse and do not provide debtors with 
constitutionally protected interests in the mere continued 
existence of a bankruptcy case.  Automatic dismissals under § 
521(i)(1), absent other grounds for dismissal, are also without 
 
claims.”) (emphasis added); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (termination of 
motorist‟s license:  “This is but an application of the general proposition that relevant 
constitutional restraints limit state power to terminate an entitlement whether the entitlement 
is denominated a „right‟ or a „privilege.‟”); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) 
(entitlement to welfare benefits). 
 164. NOWACK & ROTUNDA, supra note 162, at 620. 
 165. The Court has ruled on occasion that one must be receiving benefits before due 
process protection applies.  In Am. Mfg. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 60 (1999), 
the Court held that the plaintiff had no property right to workers‟ compensation medical 
benefits under Pennsylvania law until the claimant proved both that he or she suffered a 
work-related injury and that the proposed treatment was reasonable and necessary.  Id. at 
60-61.  The court distinguished its earlier holdings in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 
(1970), and Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), as involving, respectively, the 
continuation of state welfare benefits and federal social security disability benefits:  “In both 
cases, an individual‟s entitlement to benefits had been established, and the question 
presented was whether pre-deprivation notice and a hearing were required before the 
individual‟s interest in continued payment of benefits could be terminated.”  Id.; see also 
Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 942 (1986) (stating in dicta that “[w]e have never held that 
applicants for benefits, as distinct from those already receiving them, have a legitimate 
claim of entitlement . . . .”).  The “applying versus continuing” benefits distinction is not 
relevant here, because the automatic dismissal rules apply only to pending cases—i.e., to 
debtors who are receiving the benefits of bankruptcy protection prior to dismissal, and have 
therefore developed an expectation of continued benefits.  The “applying versus continuing” 
concept, however, would be another basis for distinguishing the filing fee cases (which are 
challenges by people who have not yet started to receive the bankruptcy benefit) from the 
instant automatic dismissal cases. 
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prejudice to the refiling of a bankruptcy petition.  With neither 
the right of access to file for bankruptcy relief nor the discharge 
of debts in bankruptcy having constitutional significance, the 
Court simply cannot see how dismissal of Miller‟s bankruptcy 




It is, of course, true that bankruptcy is not a constitutional right.  As 
the bankruptcy court in Miller recognized, the Supreme Court held in 
United States v. Kras that bankruptcy relief was neither constitutionally 
required nor a fundamental right.
167
  The issue in Kras was whether 
Congress could constitutionally require an indigent debtor to pay a $50 fee 
to file a bankruptcy petition.
168
  Shortly before hearing Kras the Supreme 
Court had ruled in Boddie v. Connecticut that the Connecticut state courts 
could not constitutionally require indigent welfare recipients to pay a fee 
for filing divorce petitions.
169
  In Kras, the five-judge majority, over a 
strong four-judge dissent, ruled that a bankruptcy discharge was not a 
fundamental individual right, like divorce, and therefore the Congress 
could constitutionally require the modest filing fee for accessing the 
bankruptcy process.  The Court theorized that the government‟s control 
over the adjustment of debts was not nearly as pervasive as it was over 
marriage relationships.
170
  The Court also denied Mr. Kras‟s equal 
protection argument, finding that the right to bankruptcy was not like free 
speech or marriage, which “the Court has come to regard as fundamental 
and that demand the lofty requirement of a compelling governmental 
interest before they may be significantly regulated.”
171
  The Court pointed 
out that there is no constitutional right to a bankruptcy discharge.  The 
Constitution gives Congress the power to make uniform laws on the subject 
of bankruptcies,
172
 but does not require it to exercise that power.  Indeed, 
there were long stretches in American history during which Congress did 
not enact bankruptcy laws, and debtors were left to the tender mercy of 
state law.
173
  Finally, the Court held that there was a rational basis for the 
 
 166. 371 B.R. 509, 516-17 (Bankr. D. Utah 2007), rev‟d on other grounds, 383 B.R. 767 
(B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2008). 
 167. 409 U.S. 434, 440 (1973). 
 168. Id. at 436-37. 
 169. 401 U.S. 371, 380-31 (1971). 
 170. Kras, 409 U.S. at 445 (“In contrast with divorce, bankruptcy is not the only method 
available to a debtor for the adjustment of his legal relationship with his creditors.  The utter 
exclusiveness of court access and court remedy, as has been noted, was a potent factor in 
Boddie.”). 
 171. Id. at 446. 
 172. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4. 
 173. Kras, 409 U.S. at 447 (“Indeed, for the entire period prior to the present Act of 
1898, the Nation was without a federal bankruptcy law except for three short periods 
aggregating about 15 1/2 years.”). 
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fee requirement, and that installment payments were available (allowing 
the petition to be filed without the fee paid up front).
174
  The dissent 
disagreed with the basic idea that bankruptcy was not a fundamental right, 
like marriage, and argued that “[t]he Constitution cannot tolerate 
achievement of the goal of self-support for a bankruptcy system, any more 
than for a domestic relations court, at the price of denying due process of 
law to the poor.”
175
 
In 2005, Congress put the filing fee question to rest, at least in Chapter 




Nevertheless, whether bankruptcy is a constitutional right or not has 
nothing to do with whether a debtor who has filed bankruptcy has a 
property right or entitlement.  Apparently without knowing it, the 
bankruptcy court in Miller erred by relying on the long rejected distinction 
between “rights” and “privileges,” rather than focusing on the debtor‟s 
entitlement—an entitlement resulting from the expectation of receiving 
continuing benefits under the bankruptcy system that Congress created.  
Congress has no obligation to create a bankruptcy system, but once it does 
so, it must provide debtors with due process before depriving them of 
continuing benefits. 
Having determined that debtors in bankruptcy have an 
“entitlement”—an expectation of continuing bankruptcy benefits after 
filing their petition and paying any required filing fee, the second question 
is whether the procedures adopted by Congress for the deprivation of those 
benefits comport with the Constitution‟s “due process” mandate.  It is 
important here to distinguish between a challenge to the substantive rules 
adopted by Congress for dismissal (failing to file one of the listed 
documents within forty-five days), and the procedures adopted by 
Congress for dismissal.  Part V below considers whether requiring 
dismissal in the event of, say, a harmless error comports with the 
requirement for substantive “due process.”  Here, however, the issue is 
whether Congress has established adequate procedures to protect against 





 174. Id. at 639-40. 
 175. Id. at 456 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 176. See 28 U.S.C. § 1930(f)(1), (3) (authorizing waiver of fees in Chapter 7 cases for 
debtors who make less than 150% of the applicable poverty guidelines, and possibly even 
permitting waivers in other cases “in accordance with Judicial Conference policy”); FED. R. 
BANKR. P. 1006(c) (incorporating the fee waiver statute). 
 177. See, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125-26 (1990) (“„Procedural due 
process rules are meant to protect persons not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or 
unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property.‟” (emphasis added) (quoting Carey v. 
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978))). 
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The Supreme Court has consistently held that the government must 
provide notice of an opportunity for a fair hearing before permanently 
depriving an individual of a governmental entitlement.
178
  This does not 
necessarily mean that a hearing must be held before benefits are 
temporarily suspended, pending a final hearing on permanent deprivation, 
because sometimes a post-deprivation hearing will provide all the process 
that is due.  In Mathews v. Eldridge,
179
 the Supreme Court adopted a 
balancing test for determining whether a hearing must be held before 
benefits are suspended: 
More precisely, our prior decisions indicate that identification of 
the specific dictates of due process generally requires 
consideration of three distinct factors:  First, the private interest 
that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures 
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government‟s interest, 
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative 




The Court in Mathews held that the procedure for suspending social 
security disability benefits satisfied the requirements for procedural due 
process even though a pre-deprivation hearing was not held—
distinguishing its earlier decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, which required an 
evidentiary hearing before the termination of welfare benefits—primarily 
because disability benefits were not calculated on the basis of need, and 
because other procedures were in place to prevent immediate harm to the 
disability claimant before a full post-deprivation hearing could be held.
181
  
The Mathews court balanced the anticipated harm to the claimant from the 
temporary suspension of benefits before a full hearing, with the 
administrative needs of the state in seeking to avoid inappropriate 
payments that may prove difficult to recover. 
The Court refined its analysis of the right to a pre-deprivation hearing 
when the statutory or administrative procedures fail to assure due process 
before terminating a claim.  In Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., the 
plaintiff, Logan, timely filed an administrative action under Illinois law 
claiming that he was wrongfully fired from his job on a loading dock 
 
 178. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (“This Court consistently has held 
that some form of hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived of a property 
interest.” (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974))). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 334-35. 
 181. 397 U.S. 254, 268-70 (1970). 
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because of a physical condition (a short leg).
182
  The Illinois statute required 
a fact-finding conference to be held within 120 days of filing.  Due to a 
clerical error by the state administrators, the fact-finding conference was 
not timely held, and the employer argued that the claim was therefore 
barred.
183
  The Court rejected the employer‟s argument, holding that Logan 
had been deprived of due process under a state procedure because the state 
did not provide a fair opportunity for hearing before Logan‟s claim was 
terminated.
184
  The Court suggested that parties have a constitutional right 
to a hearing before the permanent dismissal of a claim: 
The State may erect reasonable procedural requirements for 
triggering the right to an adjudication, be they statutes of 
limitations, or, in an appropriate case, filing fees.  And the State 
certainly accords due process when it terminates a claim for 
failure to comply with a reasonable procedural or evidentiary 
rule.  What the Fourteenth Amendment does require, however, 
“is „an opportunity . . . granted at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner,‟ „for [a] hearing appropriate to the nature of 
the case.‟”  It is such an opportunity that Logan was denied.
185
 
The Court has held that post-deprivation hearings, or even a post-
deprivation tort claim, can be all the process that is due if there is a strong 
governmental interest in prompt determination that might be destroyed by 
providing a pre-deprivation hearing, and if that interest outweighs the risk 
of harm to the claimant.  In Mathews that strong governmental interest took 
the form of payments that might be difficult to later recover.  In other 
situations, a pre-termination hearing might be impossible or extremely 
difficult or costly.
186
  In other cases, the slight harm from sequestering a 
 
 182. 455 U.S. 422, 426 (1982). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 434-35. 
 185. Id. at 437 (internal citations omitted). 
 186. See generally Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).  A prisoner mail-ordered a 
hobby kit, which was lost before delivery.  The prisoner claimed that his due process rights 
had been violated because he was not afforded a hearing before the government deprived 
him of his property by losing it.  Id. at 529.  The Court recognized that it would not be 
possible to provide the prisoner with a hearing before losing his hobby kit because the loss 
was not the result of an intentional act.  The Court held that the prisoner‟s post-deprivation 
right to lawsuit is all the process that was due under circumstances, because a pre-
deprivation hearing would not be possible.  Id. at 543-44.  While Parratt was later overruled 
in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986), because the lack of due care by a state 
or federal actor does not “deprive” a person of property within the meaning of the due 
process clauses, id. at 330-31, the ruling that factual impossibility will overcome the general 
rule of entitlement to a pre-deprivation hearing remains good law.  See also County of 
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 836 (1998) (after a police officer killed an innocent 
bystander during a high-speed chase to catch a fleeing criminal, the Court held that “only a 
purpose to cause harm . . . will satisfy the element of arbitrary conduct shocking to the 
conscience, necessary for a due process violation.”). 
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defendant‟s property would be greatly outweighed by the risk that assets 
would be dissipated by the time of a hearing.
187
 
There is little doubt under the Court‟s analysis in Mathews and Logan 
that the bankruptcy court must provide an opportunity for a pre-dismissal 
hearing.  First, there is a substantial risk of governmental error in 
automatically dismissing a bankruptcy case without notice or an 
opportunity for a hearing.  My client‟s case discussed in the introduction is 
a perfect example.
188
  It was wrongly dismissed because the court saw no 
payment advice statements on file when, in fact, none were due because the 
client had been unemployed during the relevant sixty-day period.  The 
bankruptcy court has no way to determine from a simple review of the 
docket whether or not the debtor was required to file payment advice 
statements.  The bankruptcy court needs evidence—namely, whether the 
debtor was employed and received payment advice statements during the 
applicable sixty-day period—to determine whether a violation occurred. 
Moreover, while many of the other required documents must be filed 
by all debtors, and therefore a simple review of the docket would usually 
show an apparent violation, the possibility for error still exists.  File clerks 
and computer programs are fallible.  Documents may be misfiled by a 
clerk, misindexed by a computer operator, or misreported by defective 
computer software.  Every step in the process is subject to error, and only 
through the opportunity for a pre-deprivation hearing can the damage from 
wrongful dismissal be avoided. 
Second, under the first factor of the Mathews balancing test, a debtor 
may suffer irreparable harm through the wrongful dismissal of a 
bankruptcy case, such as the loss of a home or other property that could 
have been saved in bankruptcy.  Upon dismissal, the automatic stay is 
terminated,
189
 permitting creditors to proceed with their state law collection 
and sale remedies.  The reinstatement of the case following a post-
deprivation hearing would not restore the debtor‟s lost property during the 
gap in time between dismissal and reinstatement.
190
 
Third, the government has no countervailing interest or need for 
denying a pre-deprivation hearing.  There is no administrative savings from 
having a post-deprivation hearing in lieu of a pre-deprivation hearing 
 
 187. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1978) (hearing 
required before cutting off utility service, but noting that post-deprivation hearings can be 
sufficient where the delay will not cause harm); Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 
619-20 (1974) (allowing sequestration of debtor‟s property that might otherwise be 
dissipated). 
 188. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 189. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(B). 
 190. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c)(2) (“The motion [to reinstate a dismissed case] does not affect 
the judgment‟s finality or suspend its operation.”); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 9024 (stating 
that FED. R. CIV. P. 60 applies in cases under the Code in most situations). 
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(indeed, the process for obtaining a post-deprivation hearing is far more 
cumbersome).
191
  Nor does the government have any special need for 
prompt action, as would exist if state funds were paid out and might be 
difficult to recover.  Creditors who are delayed by the continuation of the 
automatic stay are protected by the requirement that they be given adequate 
protection of their interests during the stay, and by the ample relief from 
stay provisions that are available during the pendency of the case.
192
 
There is simply no governmental or administrative benefit from early 
dismissal to counterbalance the harm caused to the debtor from wrongful 
dismissal.  The Mathews balancing test thus strongly (maybe even 
conclusively) weighs in favor of requiring a pre-deprivation hearing.  
Furthermore, unlike the provisional determination pending a final hearing 
in Mathews, the dismissal of the bankruptcy case is final, subject to review 
only on appeal and not as part of the continuing administrative process.  
The added gloss from Logan makes the debtor‟s case even stronger.  A 
judicial or administrative procedure for determining claims must fairly 
provide for an opportunity for a hearing prior to dismissal.  The Bankruptcy 
Code‟s requirement that the case “shall be automatically dismissed 
effective on the forty-sixth day”
193
 is unconstitutional because it deprives 
parties of the Fifth Amendment‟s due process right to a pre-deprivation 
hearing. 
V.   DOES THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRE RELIEF FOR HARMLESS ERRORS? 
The bankruptcy court‟s constitutional obligation to provide notice of, 
and an opportunity for, a hearing before dismissing a debtor‟s bankruptcy 
case will ultimately benefit debtors in only a small minority of cases—
those in which the debtor had in fact timely filed the paperwork required by 
the Bankruptcy Code, but for some reason the court erroneously believes 
that one or more of the required documents have not been filed.  In most 
cases, the debtor will in fact not have filed one or more of the required 
documents within the forty-five day deadline.  This section considers 
whether the bankruptcy court has the power or duty to relieve the debtor‟s 
default when it was the result of a harmless error. 
Having determined in Part III that the automatic dismissal provisions 
 
 191. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9024 (incorporating FED. R. CIV. P. 60, which allows a 
motion for relief from a judgment or order under certain conditions if the motion is filed 
within an undefined “reasonable time” but no more than one year after entry, or through an 
appeal filed within fourteen days of entry of the order under FED. R. BANKR. P. 8002). 
 192. See 11 U.S.C. § 361 (defining “adequate protection”); 11 U.S.C. § 363(d) (stating 
that relief from stay for cause is not adequately protected); 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (explaining 
that creditors can prohibit use, sale or lease of collateral if they are not adequately 
protected). 
 193. 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(1). 
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are unconstitutional as drafted, the first question is whether the courts will 
wipe the entire provision out of the statute, or whether they will “red-
pencil” the statutory provision to make it constitutional by requiring notice 
and a hearing.  If the statute is “red-penciled,” it would still require the 
court to dismiss the case at the hearing if it finds that a required document 
was not timely filed.  The standard consistently applied by the court for 
many years is to determine whether the unconstitutional provisions or 
portions of a statute (or series of interconnected statutes) are so connected 
with the constitutional ones that Congress would not have intended the 
constitutional portions to survive without the unconstitutional portions.  As 
stated in the early case of Allen v. Louisiana: 
It is an elementary principle that the same statute may be in part 
constitutional and in part unconstitutional, and that if the parts are 
wholly independent of each other, that which is constitutional 
may stand while that which is unconstitutional will be rejected.  
But . . . if they are so mutually connected with and dependent on 
each other, as conditions, considerations, or compensations for 
each other as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them 
as a whole, and that, if all could not be carried into effect, the 
legislature would not pass the residue independently, and some 
parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus 
dependent, conditional, or connected must [fall] with them.
194
 
The same rule has been in effect for many years.
195
 
It is difficult to imagine that Congress would not have wanted the 
automatic dismissal rules to be interpreted as mandatory dismissal rules if 
the “automatic” portion of the statute were to be declared unconstitutional.  
Congress clearly intended to enact a strict rule for filing errors, and its 
purpose could well be served by mandating dismissal after, rather than 
without, notice and an opportunity for hearing.  Therefore, absent another 
basis for challenging the surviving statute, the courts would almost 
certainly hold the remainder of the statute to be valid, and interpret the 
surviving statute to require dismissal after notice and a hearing for even 
innocent and harmless filing errors. 
 
 194. 103 U.S. 80, 83-84 (1880) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 195. See, e.g., Denver Area Ed. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 767 
(1996) (plurality opinion) (“Would Congress still have passed the valid sections had it 
known about the constitutional invalidity of the other portions of the statute?” (quoted with 
approval in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Basardh v. Gates, 545 F.3d 1068, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (noting that the quotation 
from Allen “has long been the rule”). 
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A.   Separation of Powers 
Is there some other basis for preserving judicial discretion to relieve 
innocent harmless errors notwithstanding Congress‟s intent to require 
mandatory dismissal?  After all, it has been repeatedly stated that the 
bankruptcy courts are “courts of equity,”
196
 and one of equity‟s most 
cherished and fundamental maxims is that “equity abhors a forfeiture.”  
Indeed the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure incorporate a Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure titled “Harmless Error” which directs that “[a]t 
every stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard all errors and 
defects that do not affect any party‟s substantial rights.”
197
 
Unfortunately for the debtor who has committed a harmless error in 
failing to file required documents, the general principles of equity and the 
general provisions of the Bankruptcy Rules would give way to a specific 
statute enacted by Congress.  As stated by the bankruptcy court in In re 
Beaty, “a bankruptcy court is a court of equity and should invoke equitable 
principles and doctrines, refusing to do so only where their application 
would be „inconsistent‟ with the Bankruptcy Code.”
198
  In this case, the 
Courts have long and consistently recognized that the exception swallows 
the rule—the specific provisions of the Bankruptcy Code override both 
general equitable principles
199
 and any procedural rules.
200
  If Congress has 
 
 196. Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 327 (1966) (“[Bankruptcy] courts are essentially 
courts of equity . . . .”); Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240 (1934) (“[C]ourts of 
bankruptcy are essentially courts of equity, and their proceedings inherently proceedings in 
equity.”); Bardes v. First Nat‟l Bank of Hawarden, 178 U.S. 524, 535 (1900); In re Beaty, 
306 F.3d 914, 922 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 197. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9005 (incorporating FED. R. CIV. P. 61). 
 198. 306 F.3d at 922 (emphasis added). 
 199. See, e.g., Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988) 
(“[W]hatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be 
exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code.”); SEC v. U.S. Realty & 
Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 455 (1940) (“A bankruptcy court is a court of equity, and 
is guided by equitable doctrines and principles except in so far as they are inconsistent with 
the Act.”) (internal citations omitted);  In re Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 791 
F.2d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 1986) (“The fact that a proceeding is equitable does not give the 
judge a free-floating discretion to redistribute rights in accordance with his personal views 
of justice and fairness, however enlightened those views may be.”); Guerin v. Weil, Gotshal 
& Manges, 205 F.2d 302, 304 (2d Cir. 1953) (“Although it has been broadly stated that a 
bankruptcy court is a court of equity, the exercise of its equitable powers must be strictly 
confined within the prescribed limits of the Bankruptcy Act.”) (internal citation omitted).  
See also In re Jamo, 283 F.3d 392, 403 (1st Cir. 2002) (“But section 105(a) [the “all writs” 
statute in the Bankruptcy Code] does not provide bankruptcy courts with a roving writ, 
much less a free hand.  The authority bestowed thereunder may be invoked only if, and to 
the extent that, the equitable remedy dispensed by the court is necessary to preserve an 
identifiable right conferred elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code.”); Official Comm. of Equity 
Sec. Holders v. Mabey, 832 F.2d 299, 302 (4th Cir. 1987) (discussing limitations of the 
courts‟ equitable powers). 
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the constitutional power to mandate dismissal, it can exercise that power to 
overcome general common law principles of equity and subordinate rules 
of procedure.  The question, therefore, is whether there are any 
constitutional limits on the power of Congress to mandate dismissal for 
innocent harmless errors. 
My first thought was that the power to grant relief from harmless 
errors might be an essential attribute of judicial power with which Congress 
could not interfere under the basic principles of separation of powers.  
Neither the Constitution nor the Court‟s separation of powers cases support 
this theory, however.  The starting place for the analysis, of course, is the 
language of the Constitution itself, which gives Congress, not the courts, 
the power to prescribe the rules applicable in the federal courts: 
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the Supreme 
Court [sic] shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases 
before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate 
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and 
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
201
 
This language was interpreted by the Supreme Court in an early 
decision written by Chief Justice John Marshall, Wayman v. Southard.
202
  
Congress enacted legislation, the Process Act, providing that federal courts 
should follow the state court procedures in effect in September 1789, 
“subject, however, to such alterations and additions as the said [federal] 
Courts respectively shall, in their discretion, deem expedient, or to such 
regulations as the Supreme Court of the United States shall think proper, 
from time to time, by rule, to prescribe . . . .”
203
  The defendants contended 
that Congress could not lawfully delegate its rule-making authority to the 
Supreme Court, and therefore the state rules and not the language of the 
 
 200. Congress gave the Supreme Court the power to provide rules of bankruptcy 
procedure in 28 U.S.C. § 2075, which specifically provides that the rules “shall not abridge, 
enlarge, or modify any substantive right.”  The language confers a power that is 
substantially similar to the Supreme Court‟s ability to make procedural rules for Article III 
courts, such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  See generally Rules Enabling Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 2072(b).  The Supreme Court held in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464-65 
(1965), that rules could not affect substantive law, and were subject to any specific 
substantive law enacted by Congress.  The same theory applies to the Bankruptcy Rules.  
See, e.g., In re Beaty, 306 F.3d at 924 (“Like a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, „a 
Bankruptcy Rule cannot create an exception to the Bankruptcy Code,‟ and it cannot 
„abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.‟” (quoting In re Jastrem, 253 F.3d 438, 
441 (9th Cir. 2001))); In re Pac. Atl. Trading Co., 33 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(“[A]ny conflict between the Bankruptcy Code and the Bankruptcy Rules must be settled in 
favor of the Code.”). 
 201. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
 202. 23 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 1 (1825). 
 203. Id. at 14-15. 
GERMAINFINALIZED_ONE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/28/2011  7:33 PM 
2011] DUE PROCESS IN BANKRUPTCY 591 
 




Justice Marshall began his analysis by first recognizing Congress‟s 
plenary constitutional power over the procedures used in federal courts:  “It 
is, undoubtedly, proper for the legislature to prescribe the manner in which 
these ministerial offices shall be performed, and this duty will never be 
devolved on any other department without urgent reasons.”
205
  
Nevertheless, the Court allowed Congress to delegate its power to make 
procedural rules to the courts, and to “fill up the details,”
206
 because it 
involved a subject “to be properly within the judicial province, and has 
been always so considered.”
207
  In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,
208
 the Court 
followed Wayman v. Southard in upholding Congress‟s power under the 
Rules Enabling Act of 1934 to enact the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
stating:  “Congress has undoubted power to regulate the practice and 
procedure of federal courts, and may exercise that power by delegating to 
this or other federal courts authority to make rules not inconsistent with the 
statutes or Constitution of the United States.”
209
  Wayman and Sibbach 
show that the Court has consistently recognized that the Congress has 
plenary power over federal court procedure, and the courts have only 
secondary power to regulate when that authority is either expressly 
delegated by Congress, or possibly when Congress is silent.  The 
judiciary‟s power to regulate its own procedures comes from Congress‟s 
express or implied delegation. 
The Court‟s separation of powers jurisprudence has focused on two 
major areas of concern for the relationship between the legislative and 
judicial branches.  In Mistretta v. United States, the Court considered, and 
ultimately upheld, the validity of the federal sentencing guidelines written 
under a delegation of power by Congress to the United States Sentencing 
Commission.
210
  The Commission was housed in the judicial branch, and 
included as members three sitting federal judges appointed by the 
President.  The law provided that the guidelines would be binding on the 
courts in imposing sentences, and thus the Commission at the time had the 
 
 204. Id. at 11. 
 205. Id. at 45-46. 
 206. Id. at 43. 
 207. Id. at 45.  The Court also refused to specify what powers could and could not be 
delegated by Congress to another branch:  “The difference between the departments 
undeoubtedly [sic] is, that the legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary 
construes the law; but the maker of the law may commit something to the discretion of the 
other departments, and the precise boundary of this power is a subject of delicate and 
difficult inquiry, into which a Court will not enter unnecessarily.”  Id. at 46. 
 208. 312 U.S. 1 (1941). 
 209. Id. at 9-10. 
 210. 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989). 
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earmarks of a law-making body.
211
  Mistretta, a criminal defendant who had 
been sentenced under the guidelines, challenged the guideline system as an 




The Court began its analysis in Mistretta by identifying its two 
primary separation of powers concerns in respect to the legislative and 
judicial branches: 
In cases specifically involving the Judicial Branch, we have 
expressed our vigilance against two dangers:  first, that the 
Judicial Branch neither be assigned nor allowed “tasks that are 
more properly accomplished by [other] branches,” and, second, 
that no provision of law “impermissibly threatens the institutional 
integrity of the Judicial Branch.”
213
 
The assignment concern was considered in Morrison v. Olson, which 
gave the judicial branch the power to appoint, on referral from the Attorney 
General, an independent counsel to investigate and, if warranted, prosecute 
a member of the executive branch for criminal conduct.
214
  The Act also 
gave the judicial branch various administrative duties in connection with 
the appointment.
215
  The Court, over a vigorous dissent by Justice Scalia 
who claimed that the majority was permitting the creation of a fourth 
branch of government answerable to no one, upheld the Act because the 
judiciary was not given the power to unilaterally appoint prosecutors 
without executive involvement.  Importantly, the Court‟s decision 
recognized that there are important limits on Congress‟s power to assign to 




The assignment concern seems entirely inapplicable to the mandatory 
dismissal rules.  In requiring the mandatory dismissal of bankruptcy cases 
for filing errors, Congress is not requiring the judiciary to perform any acts 
that should properly be performed by another branch of government under 
the Constitution. 
The Court‟s second separation of powers concern involved protecting 
the institutional integrity of the judicial branch.  The cases cited by the 
Court involved concerns over Congress eroding the judicial branch‟s role 
in adjudicating questions within its jurisdiction by assigning adjudicatory 
functions to courts or agencies established outside of Article III‟s mandate 
of life tenure and undiminishable salaries—protections designed to assure 
 
 211. Id. at 367. 
 212. Id. at 369. 
 213. Id. at 383 (internal citations omitted). 
 214. 487 U.S. 654, 660 (1988). 
 215. Id. at 680. 
 216. Id. at 684-87. 
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the independence of the decision maker against potential threats from the 
political branches.
217
  Once again, the Court‟s concern with the delegation 
of adjudicative power to judges who lack the hallmarks of independence 
required by Article III seems entirely unrelated to any concern with 
Congress mandating case dismissal for harmless filing errors. 
The Court has also expressed concern that its core judicial powers are 
eroded when Congress improperly interferes in individual cases after the 
Court‟s powers have attached.  Although the Court has historically given 
Congress great leeway in defining the Court‟s jurisdiction,
218
 the Court has 
rejected blatant attempts by Congress to legislate the result in particular 




United States v. Klein arose shortly after the Civil War, during 
Reconstruction.  Congress, through various statutes, authorized a prior 
owner to recover property seized during the war upon proof that the owner 
had not offered “aid and comfort to the late rebellion.”
220
  Prior to Klein, 
the Supreme Court ruled that a presidential pardon would, as a matter of 
law, satisfy the statutory requirement.
221
  Congress enacted a new law to 
reverse the Supreme Court‟s ruling.
222
  The new law provided that 
presidential pardons would neither be admissible in evidence nor 
considered by the Court of Claims in determining whether the claimant had 
provided aid and comfort to the enemy.
223
  Furthermore, the law required 
pardons to state the specific acts being pardoned, and required the Court of 
Claims to accept the stated facts as conclusively proven.
224
  Finally, the 
statute deprived the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction to overturn a 
Court of Claims determination of forfeiture if a presidential pardon existed, 
so that the Court would be unable to question the constitutionality of the 
new law.
225
  The Court held that the statute was unconstitutional under 
 
 217. Commodity Futures Trading Comm‟n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 841 (1986) 
(upholding legislative scheme allowing the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, a 
non-Article III adjudicative body, to hear related counterclaims asserted in an enforcement 
proceeding within its jurisdiction); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 
U.S. 50, 87 (1982) (striking down the bankruptcy system which allowed non-Article III 
bankruptcy judges to hear a broad range of matters that were only related to bankruptcy). 
 218. See, e.g., Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 511-12 (1868) (allowing the 
Civil War Congress to repeal a habeas corpus statute to deprive the Court of jurisdiction to 
hear McCardle‟s petition). 
 219. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). 
 220. Id. at 129. 
 221. United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531, 536 (1869). 
 222. Klein, 80 U.S. at 143. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id.  The Court in Klein summed up the effect of the statute as follows:  “The 
substance of this enactment is that an acceptance of a pardon, without disclaimer, shall be 
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separation of powers principles for three reasons.  First, it was the Court‟s 
job to determine the effect of a pardon under the Constitution, which it had 
already done, and Congress could not alter a pardon‟s affect.
226
  Second, the 
statute unconstitutionally purported to strip the Supreme Court of 
jurisdiction based on its findings that a pardon existed, which amounted to 
a usurpation of its judicial function to determine the merits of the case.
227
  
The attempt to condition the Court‟s jurisdiction on the outcome of the case 




Congress has already provided that the Supreme Court shall have 
jurisdiction of the judgments of the Court of Claims on appeal. 
Can it prescribe a rule in conformity with which the court must 
deny to itself the jurisdiction thus conferred, because and only 
because its decision, in accordance with settled law, must be 
adverse to the government and favorable to the suitor? This 
question seems to us to answer itself.
229
 




The separation of powers principles enunciated in Klein carry through 
to modern times in several ways.  First, while Congress can change the 
judiciary‟s interpretation of a law prospectively (or even retrospectively to 
pending cases) by changing the law,
231
 it cannot change the final outcome 
of a court decision between the parties through a change in the law.  For 
example, in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., the Court, citing Klein, held 
that Congress could not extend retroactively the statute of limitations to 




conclusive evidence of the acts pardoned, but shall be null and void as evidence of the rights 
conferred by it, both in the Court of Claims and in this court on appeal.”  Id. at 144. 
 226. Id. at 148 (“Now it is clear that the legislature cannot change the effect of such a 
pardon any more than the executive can change a law.  Yet this is attempted by the 
provision under consideration.”).  Note that the dissent argues that the Court‟s previous 
decision in Padelford applied only to a governmental seizure after a pardon had been 
granted, not before as in Klein.  Id. at 150 (Miller, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 227. Id. at 146. 
 228. Id. (“The court is required to ascertain the existence of certain facts and thereupon 
to declare that its jurisdiction on appeal has ceased, by dismissing the bill.  What is this but 
to prescribe a rule for the decision of a cause in a particular way?”). 
 229. Id. at 147. 
 230. Id. (“The rule prescribed is also liable to just exception as impairing the effect of a 
pardon, and thus infringing the constitutional power of the Executive.”). 
 231. See, e.g., Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc‟y, 503 U.S. 429, 440 (1992) 
(identifying ways how Congress can modify a judicial interpretation of the law); Pa. v. 
Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (1 How.) 421, 435 (1855) (recognizing that, 
through retrospective amendments to existing law, Congress can change the rules for 
decision in pending cases). 
 232. 514 U.S. 211, 227 (1995). 
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Second, Congress cannot require the judiciary blindly to accept 
someone else‟s fact findings.  In Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, the 
Attorney General certified that defendant Lamagno was acting as an agent 
of the United States when Lamagno allegedly committed a tort, injuring the 
plaintiff, in a foreign country.
233
  If the Attorney General‟s certification was 
correct, Lamagno would have no personal liability for the suit, and the 
principle of sovereign immunity would bar the claim against the United 
States.  The plaintiff argued that the Attorney General‟s certification was 
erroneous, and Lamagno argued that by statute the Attorney General‟s 
certification was binding on the Court.
234
  The Court rejected Lamagno‟s 
interpretation of the statute, assuming that Congress did not intend to vest 
the Attorney General with final fact-finding authority in cases where the 
government would have immunity.
235
  Citing Klein, the Court also 
suggested that if Congress had intended to require the Court to rubber 
stamp the Attorney General‟s certification, Congress‟s action would likely 
violate separation of powers principles: 
Congress may be free to establish a compensation scheme that 
operates without court participation.  But that is a matter quite 
different from instructing a court automatically to enter a 
judgment pursuant to a decision the court has no authority to 
evaluate.  Cf. United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128, 146 (1872) 
(Congress may not “prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial 
Department of the government in cases pending before it”).  We 




The threat in Lamagno to hold unconstitutional any attempt by 
Congress to require the judiciary to adopt someone else‟s fact-finding is 
clear. 
Congress has not sought in the automatic dismissal rules to eliminate 
the courts‟ fact-finding function.  As drafted, cases automatically are 
dismissed only if required documents are not filed.  If the court finds that 
the required documents have been filed, the case would not be subject to 
automatic or mandatory dismissal.  Therefore, the threat in Lamagno would 
have no direct applicability to the automatic dismissal rules that are the 
subject of this article. 
However, it is also a core Article III “province and duty” of the 




 233. 515 U.S. 417, 420 (1994). 
 234. Id. at 422-23. 
 235. Id. at 426. 
 236. Id. at 430 (citation omitted). 
 237. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 
(1803)). 
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If Congress cannot interfere with the core judicial function of fact-finding, 
may an analogous argument be made that Congress cannot constitutionally 
interfere with the judiciary‟s interpretive function by mandating dismissal 
of bankruptcy cases for filing errors? 
There is an important distinction between fact-finding and law 
interpretation that must be recognized at the outset:  Congress does not 
make facts but it has the power to make the law.  While Congress cannot 
change what the court interpreted the law to be in a particular case,
238
 it can 
change the law itself.  For example, in Robertson v. Seattle Audubon 
Society, environmental groups sued to prevent timber harvesting in certain 
areas to protect the northern spotted owl, an endangered species.
239
  The 
courts enjoined some of the harvesting and timber sales.  Congress 
responded to the litigation by passing a law that specifically allowed some 
of the harvesting that had been enjoined by the court.
240
  The environmental 
defendants sought immediate dismissal of their cases and argued that 
Congress was interfering with the judiciary‟s function to decide particular 
cases.
241
  The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the 
environmental groups, and held Congress‟s law to be an unconstitutional 
intrusion into the judicial process: 
The statute “does not, by its plain language, repeal or amend the 
environmental laws underlying this litigation,” but rather “directs 
the court to reach a specific result and make certain factual 




The Supreme Court in Seattle Audubon Society rejected the Court of 
Appeals‟ analysis.  The Supreme Court determined that Congress had 
effectively changed the law by allowing the logging.
243
  The Court refused 
to consider, because it had not been advanced below, an argument made by 
one of the environmental groups that a law which amends a statute only so 
broadly as to affect the decision in a particular case should be invalidated 




 238. Id. at 240 (holding that Congress cannot revive cases that have been dismissed by 
final court orders). 
 239. 503 U.S. 429, 432 (1992). 
 240. Id. at 433. 
 241. Id. at 435-36. 
 242. Seattle Audubon Soc‟y, 503 U.S. at 436 (quoting Seattle Audubon Soc‟y v. 
Robertson, 914 F.2d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
 243. Id. at 440-41. 
 244. Id. at 441 (“[Public Citizen] contends that even a change in law, prospectively 
applied, would be unconstitutional if the change swept no more broadly, or little more 
broadly, than the range of applications at issue in the pending cases.  This alternative theory 
was neither raised below nor squarely considered by the Court of Appeals; nor was it 
advanced by respondents in this Court.  Accordingly, we decline to address it here.”). 
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Any separation of powers arguments concerning the Court‟s inherent 
equitable powers that might have survived Seattle Audobon Society were 
quickly quashed in Miller v. French.
245
  A lower court had issued an 
injunction in 1975, which was still in effect at the time of the decision in 
2000, prohibiting the operation of a state prison in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.
246
  In 1996, Congress passed new law setting specific 
standards for the entry and termination of prospective relief in prison 
cases.
247
  The statute also provided that if the prison authorities file a 
motion under the new law for termination of prospective relief, the court 
was required to rescind its existing injunction and was prohibited from 
entering a new injunction until it determined the motion on the merits.
248
  
The district court ruled that the provision automatically staying any interim 
equitable relief was unconstitutional because it deprived the court of its 
inherent equitable powers.
249
  The Supreme Court reversed, holding that 
Congress has the power to change the law and overturn any earlier grant of 
prospective relief without implicating any separation of powers concerns 
under Klein.
250
  The Court distinguished between legislation that purported 
to overturn a final court ruling granting retrospective relief,
251
 such as a 
damages award, and legislation that overturns a court ruling granting 
prospective relief.
252
  The former violates the Court‟s authority under 
separation of powers principles, while the latter is a proper act of the 
legislature to change the law.  Similarly, the Court quickly dispatched the 
prisoner‟s arguments that Congress‟s legislation interfered with the 
equitable powers of the judiciary: 
[The automatic stay] operates in conjunction with the new 
standards for the continuation of prospective relief; if the new 
standards . . . are not met, then the stay “shall operate” unless and 
 
 245. 530 U.S. 327 (2000). 
 246. Id. at 331-32. 
 247. Id. at 333. 
 248. Id. at 333-34. 
 249. Id. at 331-32. 
 250. Id. at 349. 
 251. See supra note 232 and accompanying text. 
 252. Miller, 530 U.S. at 344 (“Prospective relief under a continuing, executory decree 
remains subject to alteration due to changes in the underlying law.”).  In support of this 
proposition, the Court cited Pa. v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 
(1851) [hereinafter Wheeling Bridge I] and Pa. v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. 
(18 How.) 421 (1855) [hereinafter Wheeling Bridge II].   In Wheeling Bridge I, the court 
issued an injunction requiring the removal of a bridge because it was built too low under 
existing law.  54 U.S. (13 How.) at 608-09.  Following the Court‟s decision, Congress 
passed a law validating the construction of the bridge.  After the bridge was destroyed in a 
storm, Pennsylvania sought to prevent the reconstruction of the bridge in violation of the 
court‟s injunction.  In Wheeling Bridge II, the Court held that Congress‟s law validating the 
bridge rendered the injunction from Wheeling Bridge I unenforceable.  59 U.S. (18 How.) at 
436. 
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until the court makes the findings required by [the new law].  
Rather than prescribing a rule of decision, [the law] simply 




After the Court‟s ruling in Miller v. French, it is difficult to see any 
constitutional challenge to the automatic dismissal rules under separation of 
powers principles.  In Miller, the Court rejected the prisoner‟s arguments 
that the Court has inherent equitable powers of relief over which Congress 
cannot legislate.  The Court‟s separation of powers jurisprudence puts no 
limits on Congress‟s powers to legislate prospectively, or to apply the law 
to pending cases and even to previous grants of prospective relief. 
Several constitutional law experts suggested that I look into the 
Court‟s recent jurisprudence overturning the mandatory nature of the 
federal sentencing guidelines, suggesting that the mandatory nature of the 
guidelines was held to be unconstitutional because the guidelines 
encroached on the judiciary‟s turf.  While the sentencing guideline cases 
are fascinating, the decisions were not based on separation of powers 
principles. 
Preceding the attack on the sentencing guidelines, the Supreme Court 
ruled in Apprendi v. New Jersey and Blakely v. Washington that a trial 
judge could not enhance a criminal defendant‟s sentence beyond the 
statutory maximum prescribed for the crime on the basis of the facts either 
admitted by the defendant or found by the jury.
254
  In United States v. 
Booker, the Court was forced to apply the theory of Apprendi and Blakely 
to the mandatory sentencing guidelines.
255
  In both cases, the applicable 
federal statute under which the defendants were convicted provided for a 
broad sentencing range of between ten years and life.
256
  However, the 
sentencing guidelines were much more specific than the statute, requiring 
sentences to be imposed in narrow guidelines depending on the quantity of 
drugs for which the defendant was responsible.
257
 
After the jury‟s verdict, the trial judges in the two cases heard 
evidence in the sentencing phase showing that the defendants were 
responsible for much larger quantities of drugs than had been determined 
 
 253. Miller, 530 U.S. at 349. 
 254. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004) (“the „statutory maximum‟ for 
Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the 
facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” (emphasis omitted)); 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (“Other than the fact of a prior 
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
 255. 543 U.S. 220, 243-44 (2005). 
 256. Id. at 226. 
 257. Based on the quantity of drugs found by the jury, the sentencing guidelines would 
be between 210 and 262 months for Booker, and 78 months for Fanfan.  Id. at 227-28. 
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by the jury.  The judge‟s findings resulted in longer sentences under the 
sentencing guidelines than would result under the sentencing guidelines on 
the basis of the jury‟s quantity determinations, although both sentences 
would have been within the broad statutory range.
258
 
The Court determined that the sentencing guidelines, if interpreted as 
drafted to be mandatory, had the effect of binding law, just like a statute.
259
  
Therefore, under Apprendi and Blakely, the courts could not 
constitutionally sentence the defendant to a term longer than prescribed by 
the sentencing guidelines on the basis of the facts determined by the jury.  
However, if the sentencing guidelines were not mandatory, but merely 
suggested ranges to be considered by the trial judge, then the guidelines 
would no longer have the effect of a statute under Apprendi and Blakely.  
This would allow the judge to consider facts not admitted or determined by 
the jury in enhancing the guideline sentence, as long as it was within the 
broad range statutory limits set by statute.
260
  In a separate opinion by 
Justice Breyer, the Court solved the tangle between the sentencing 
guidelines and the Sixth Amendment by making the guidelines advisory 
rather than mandatory: 
We answer the question of remedy by finding the provision of the 
federal sentencing statute that makes the Guidelines mandatory 
incompatible with today‟s constitutional holding.  We conclude 
that this provision must be severed and excised, as must one 
other statutory section, which depends upon the Guidelines‟ 
mandatory nature.  So modified, the federal sentencing statute 
makes the Guidelines effectively advisory.  It requires a 
sentencing court to consider Guidelines ranges, but it permits the 




The Court‟s sole stated concern in Booker and Fanfan was for the 
defendant‟s Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine all facts upon 
which a mandatory penalty is imposed.  The Justices did not express any 
concern with the power of Congress to establish penalties ranges, or even 
 
 258. In Booker‟s case, the judge‟s findings resulted in a sentence of thirty years to life, 
and in Fanfan‟s case between 188 and 235 months.  Id. 
 259. Id. at 233 (“As the dissenting opinions in Blakely recognized, there is no distinction 
of constitutional significance between the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the 
Washington procedures at issue in that case.  This conclusion rests on the premise, common 
to both systems, that the relevant sentencing rules are mandatory and impose binding 
requirements on all sentencing judges.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). 
 260. Id. at 233 (“If the Guidelines as currently written could be read as merely advisory 
provisions that recommended, rather than required, the selection of particular sentences in 
response to differing sets of facts, their use would not implicate the Sixth Amendment.  We 
have never doubted the authority of a judge to exercise broad discretion in imposing a 
sentence within a statutory range.”). 
 261. Id. at 245 (internal citations omitted). 
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to fix a specific penalty that the court must impose for specific crimes.  
Nothing in the decision or its antecedents states any separation of powers 
limitation on Congress‟s authority to require mandatory dismissal of 
bankruptcy cases for filing errors.
262
 
Under existing Supreme Court authority, there seems to be no basis 
for challenging the mandatory dismissal rules on separation of powers 
grounds.  The Court‟s separation of powers concerns have extended only to 
laws that impose someone else‟s fact findings on the judiciary, overturn 
final judicial decisions granting retrospective relief, delegate excessively 
broad judicial authority to non-Article III decision makers, or attempt to 
improperly assign non-adjudicatory functions to the judiciary.  None of 
these concerns are implicated in the automatic dismissal rules.  The 
bankruptcy court retains its authority to adjudicate the facts of the case 
(whether or not any required papers were timely filed), the law does not 
apply retroactively to cases finally determined prior to its effective date, 
and no adjudicative functions were assigned outside of the bankruptcy 
process supervised by Article III judges.
263
  If the judiciary has some 
inherent equitable powers that Congress cannot eliminate under 
constitutional separation of powers principles, that power has yet to be 
 
 262. It is worth noting that some scholars believe that the Court‟s sentencing 
jurisprudence that led to Apprendi was based on separation of powers principles.  See 
Sanjay Chhablani, Disentangling the Sixth Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 487, 512 
(2009) (noting that the Court rejected the legislature‟s characterization of facts as sentencing 
factors that would not be subject to the Sixth Amendment).  Moreover, Justice Stevens 
argued in his dissent in Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683 (2010), a case upholding 
against Sixth Amendment challenge a portion of the sentencing guidelines requiring their 
mandatory use in a sentence reduction proceedings brought about by a guideline reduction, 
that the sentencing commissions interpretations after Booker should not be given effect 
under separation of powers principles.  Justice Stevens suggested that if the sentencing 
commission sought to uphold the mandatory nature of the guidelines by requiring judges to 
submit all sentencing facts to the jury “we would either strike down such an act on 
separation-of-powers grounds or apply the same remedy we did in Booker to render the 
statement advisory.”  Id. at 2702 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Thus, although a majority of the 
court decided Booker on the basis solely of the Sixth Amendment, there remains some room 
for the development of the separation of powers doctrine. 
 263. Following the Supreme Court‟s decision in N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon 
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 50 (1982), invalidating the bankruptcy system for delegating 
excessive adjudicatory authority to non-Article III judges, the bankruptcy system was 
restructured to vest all bankruptcy jurisdiction in the Article III district courts, 28 U.S.C. § 
1334, who then refer cases to the bankruptcy courts.  Id. at § 157(a).  The Article III district 
courts retain complete and unfettered control of the jurisdictional reference, id. at § 157(d), 
and Article III courts must provide de novo review of non-core matters, and appellate 
review of core matters.  See id. at §§ 157(c)(1), (b)(1), 158 (respectively).  The automatic 
dismissal provisions raise no special concerns of the type at issue in Marathon, because the 
rules apply only to the debtor‟s post-petition obligations arising directly under the 
Bankruptcy Code, and not to the state law claims in Marathon that were only “related to” 
bankruptcy. 
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identified or recognized by the Court. 
B.   Substantive Due Process 
The second constitutional basis for challenging the mandatory 
dismissal rules is, once again, the Due Process Clause.  This challenge, 
unlike the procedural one discussed earlier, would require the Due Process 
Clause to impose substantive limits on the power of the legislative branch 
to legislate. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, a conservative Supreme 
Court regularly used the doctrine of substantive due process to strike down 
progressive-area economic legislation.
264
  As the century progressed, 
however, the doctrine had the misfortune of colliding head-on with 
President Franklin Roosevelt‟s New Deal in the depths of the Great 
Depression, and all but died in the crash.
265
  The court has not struck down 
 
 264. The period from 1874-1937, during which the Supreme Court felt free to question 
and strike down state and federal laws attempting to regulate the free market, has become 
known as the Lochner era, after the Supreme Court‟s decision in Lochner v. New York, 198 
U.S. 45 (1905), which struck down New York‟s attempt to limit the hours worked in the 
baking industry. 
 265. The well-known story of the demise of the Lochner era is suitable for a feature film.  
After the Court struck down a number of key New Deal programs, President Franklin 
Roosevelt, who had just received a landslide victory in the 1936 election, announced that he 
would support the Judiciary Reorganization Bill of 1937, which has become known as the 
“Court Packing Plan.”  The bill would have expanded the number of justices on the Court—
one new justice for each sitting member who was over 70.5 years of age, up to a total of six 
new justices.  Less than two months before the court packing plan was announced, however, 
Justice Owen Roberts announced that he was switching sides in West Coast Hotel Co. v. 
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), which upheld state minimum wage laws, and overturned the 
Supreme Court‟s earlier minimum wage precedent in Adkins v. Children‟s Hospital, 261 
U.S. 525 (1923).  West Coast Hotel was issued at around the same time as the Court Packing 
Plan was announced, and was followed by a string of decisions upholding new deal 
legislation.  See Wright v. Vinton Branch, 300 U.S. 440 (1937) (upholding the new Frazier-
Lemke Act staying foreclosure actions); Virginian Ry. Co. v. Ry. Emps., 300 U.S. 515 
(1937) (upholding the Railway Labor Act); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 
U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the National Labor Relations Act); NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 
301 U.S. 49 (1937) (same); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 
(1937) (same); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) (same); Wash. Coach Co. v. 
NLRB, 301 U.S. 142 (1937) (same).  In July 1937, Senate Majority Leader Joseph T. 
Robinson led the charge to pass the Court Packing Plan, holding the floor for two days 
arguing for its passage.  MARIAN CECILIA MCKENNA, FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE GREAT 
CONSTITUTIONAL WAR: THE COURT-PACKING CRISIS OF 1937 498-505 (Fordham University 
Press 2002).  A short time later, Robinson was complaining of chest pain, and on July 14 
was found dead of a heart attack in his apartment.  Id.  According to McKenna, any hope of 
passing the Court Packing Plan died along with him.  On July 22, the Senate voted by an 
overwhelming majority to send the judicial reform measure back to committee, where the 
court packing language was stripped out.  Justice Roberts‟s decision to shift the Court‟s 
majority to support new deal programs became known as the “switch in time that saved 
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The modern Supreme Court has established about as loose a standard 
as possible for testing the validity of legislation—the rational basis test.  
The test asks only that the legislation be “rationally related to a legitimate 
governmental purpose.”
267
  In determining whether the legislation had a 
“rationally related” basis, the Court will strain to imagine any supportive 
theory, even if the basis stated in the legislation was not rational, or even if 
no basis was stated in the legislation itself or in its legislative history.
268
 
The Court would not have to strain to find a rational basis for the 
mandatory dismissal rule.  Congress may have believed that bankruptcy 
judges were too timid in using their discretionary dismissal powers, 
allowing debtors who regularly failed to comply with the filing rules to 
nevertheless obtain the generous benefit of a bankruptcy discharge.  The 
tougher standard of mandatory dismissal could be easily justified as a 
remedy for lax judicial enforcement. 
But that justification does not explain the need to eliminate the 
standard equitable defenses of excusable neglect and harmless error.  
Congress could have obtained the same benefit by requiring dismissal 
unless the debtor establishes that the filing error was excusable, promptly 
cured and harmless.  In its zeal to distance itself from the unprincipled 
Lochner era
269
 decisions, however, the Court has stated that it will not use 
substantive due process to question legislation that is overbroad.  For 
example, in Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., the Court upheld 
an Oklahoma law prohibiting opticians from fitting or duplicating eye 
glasses, or even soliciting the sale of frames or mountings, without a 
prescription from a licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist.
270
  The Court 
 
nine,” although his decision to change sides preceded the introduction of the court packing 
bill.  The Switch in Time that Saved Nine, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_switch_in_time_that_saved_nine.  It also spelled the death 
knell for the liberal application of substantive due process. 
 266. See IRWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 628 (3d ed., Walters Kluwer 
2009). 
 267. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (“[T]he existence of 
facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for regulatory legislation 
affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless 
in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to 
preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and 
experience of the legislators.”). 
 268. Id.; see also Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 326 (1993) (“„States are not required to 
convince the courts of the correctness of their legislative judgments.‟ Thus, since „the 
question is at least debatable,‟ rational-basis review permits a legislature to use just this sort 
of generalization.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 269. See supra note 264 and accompanying text. 
 270. 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
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upheld the law even though it recognized that it was unnecessarily 
overbroad to achieve the state‟s legitimate objective: 
But the law need not be in every respect logically consistent with 
its aims to be constitutional.  It is enough that there is an evil at 
hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the 
particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.  
The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause . . . 
to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial 
conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of 
harmony with a particular school of thought.  We emphasize 
again what Justice Waite said in Munn v. State of Illinois, “for 
protection against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to 
the polls, not the courts.”
271
 
Nevertheless, there is some recent Supreme Court authority that may 
suggest a new role for substantive due process when the effect of the law is 
to excessively and inappropriately punish conduct rather than to properly 
regulate behavior.  In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, a jury awarded 
an Alabama new car buyer two million dollars in punitive damages because 
the manufacturer had repaired, under its standard policy, some minor 
cosmetic damage to the new vehicle without disclosing the repair to the 
buyer.
272
  The court stated outright:  “The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State from imposing a „grossly 
excessive‟ punishment on a tortfeasor.”
273
  The Court went on to find the 
award excessive because the punitive damages were calculated on the basis 
of national car sales,
274
 rather than just Alabama sales, and because the 
award was so excessive in relation to actual damages that it violated the 
requirement that parties have fair notice of the severity of punishment to 
which their conduct might be subject.
275
  In later cases, the Court has 
suggested that the Due Process Clause generally prohibits punitive damage 
awards that are not “reasonable and proportionate to the amount of harm to 
the plaintiff and to the general damages recovered,”
276
 and requires a high 
 
 271. Id. at 487-88 (internal citations omitted). 
 272. 517 U.S. 559, 567 (1996). 
 273. Id. at 562. 
 274. Id. at 572 (“We think it follows from these principles of state sovereignty and 
comity that a State may not impose economic sanctions on violators of its laws with the 
intent of changing the tortfeasors‟ lawful conduct in other States.”). 
 275. Id. at 574 (“Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional 
jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will 
subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose.”). 
 276. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 426 (2003) (overturning 
bad faith insurance punitive damages award of $145 million on actual damages of $1 
million).  See also Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346-47 (2007) (“The Due 
Process Clause forbids a State to use a punitive damages award to punish a defendant for 
injury inflicted on strangers to the litigation.”). 
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The only conceivable purpose for dismissing a bankruptcy case for a 
filing error caused by harmless excusable neglect is deterrence.  A severe 
penalty for mistakes may well encourage diligence by others, but it does 
nothing useful to the person who committed the harmless excusable error.  
From the point of view of the innocent mistaken filer, it is an excessive and 
unwarranted penalty, unreasonable and disproportionate to any conceivable 
harm caused by the mistake.  The same deterrence could be had by 
requiring dismissal only when the filing errors are not excusable.  Without 
doubt, the punitive damages cases arise in a very different context—the 
punitive damages award is imposed by a jury during trial, rather than being 
imposed by legislation designed for a broad proper purpose.
278
  Yet, the 
cases appear to recognize a fundamental principal of American 
constitutional law:  the punishment should fit the crime.  While the Court 
has not extended its punitive damages analysis to statutory procedural 
penalties, such as mandatory dismissal, the broad theory in the decisions 
may plant the seeds for a constitutional limit on a mandatory dismissal rule 
that is so overbroad as to offend traditional equitable notions of fairness. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The automatic dismissal rules by their terms require self-executing 
dismissal if any of the required documents are not filed within forty-five 
days after bankruptcy.  The courts cannot properly interpret the automatic 
dismissal rules to be anything other than mandatory and self-executing.  As 
the Supreme Court in Hamilton v. Lanning recently suggested, the courts 
cannot retroactively relieve the filing requirement after the case has been 
automatically dismissed.  There is also no basis for making judicial 
exceptions to the statutory language.  Congress‟s intent is manifest.  To 
challenge the rules, one must challenge Congress‟s power to make them 
 
 277. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425 (“[W]e have been reluctant to identify concrete 
constitutional limits on the ratio between harm, or potential harm, to the plaintiff and the 
punitive damages award . . . .  We decline again to impose a bright-line ratio which a 
punitive damages award cannot exceed.  Our jurisprudence and the principles it has now 
established demonstrate, however, that, in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit 
ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due 
process.”). 
 278. In TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., the Court rejected the suggestion that a 
punitive statute should be per se valid, while a Court‟s punitive damage award should be 
subject to constitutional scrutiny:  “Nonetheless, we find neither formulation satisfactory.  
Under respondents‟ rational-basis standard, apparently any award that would serve the 
legitimate state interest in deterring or punishing wrongful conduct, no matter how large, 
would be acceptable.”  509 U.S. 443, 456 (1993). 
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rather than argue that Congress did not intend what the rules clearly say.  
As a matter of statutory interpretation, the bankruptcy court has no 
discretion under the rule—it must find that the bankruptcy case has 
automatically been dismissed whenever the debtor fails to file one of the 
required documents within the forty-five day period, even if the debtor is 
abusing the bankruptcy process by seeking dismissal of his or her own 
case, and even if the judge thinks dismissal an excessively harsh sanction 
for an innocent and harmless filing error.  Whether or not the law is unfair 
is for Congress to decide, as long as Congress acts within its constitutional 
authority. 
The question then is whether Congress has acted within its 
constitutional authority in enacting the automatic dismissal rules.  Once 
Congress grants a bankruptcy right, it has created an entitlement—an 
expectation by those who have filed bankruptcy that they will receive the 
authorized relief.  The entitlement constitutes a property right, and 
Congress cannot constitutionally deprive individuals of that right without 
according them due process of law.  As a matter of procedural due process, 
Congress must provide notice and an opportunity for a hearing before 
dismissal, unless there is some governmental need that outweighs the harm 
of a post-deprivation hearing.  There is no government need for prompt 
dismissal that outweighs the individual harm of wrongful dismissal.  
Therefore, the requirement that cases be automatically dismissed without 
notice or an opportunity for a hearing is unconstitutional. 
The next question is whether the statute must be stricken entirely, or 
should be enforced in a constitutional way.  The purpose of the statute 
could be carried out by removing the unconstitutional portion—by 
requiring notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to dismissal.  
Therefore, the Court would likely “red-pencil” the statute to require notice 
and a hearing, but would enforce Congress‟s intent by mandating dismissal 
whenever the rule has been violated.  The hearing requirement would only 
help those who complied with the statute by timely filing all required 
documents; it would not help those who made an excusable and harmless 
error in failing to file a required document.  To prevent automatic dismissal 
in cases of excusable harmless error, the court would have to find another 
constitutional basis for questioning Congress‟s substantive law-making 
authority.  That is no easy task.  The separation of powers cases reject the 
notion that the Court‟s equitable powers should override Congress‟s will, 
and the doctrine of substantive due process has been largely rendered a 
dead letter in the law following the heady days of judicial activism at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. 
However, Congress‟s recent punitive damages jurisprudence raises at 
least the possibility that requiring mandatory dismissal for excusable and 
harmless errors may be seen as unfairly punitive and, therefore, offensive 
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to traditional notions of substantive due process.  Whether the Court would 
extend the substantive principle of proportionality recognized in the 
punitive damages cases to a law that has the effect of an unfair judicial 
punishment for innocent filing errors is a matter of uncertainty. 
In the end, one can only hope that Congress will remedy the problems 
associated with the automatic dismissal rules.  Most importantly, Congress 
should amend the rules to, first, require a hearing prior to dismissal, and, 
second, give the Courts the authority to refuse mandatory dismissal when 
necessary to prevent bad debtors from abusing the bankruptcy process and 
protect honest and deserving debtors who made excusable harmless errors. 
